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It is a commonplace that the Justices of the Supreme
Court disagree about how to interpret the Constitution. What
is less clear is whether any of us ought to be troubled by this.
In a recent interview, Justice Antonin Scalia characterized it
as “sort of an embarrassment” that the Justices are not “in
agreement on the basic question of what we think we’re doing
when we interpret the Constitution.”1 Yet, while the Justices
clearly are not in agreement, neither do their opinions reflect a
collective sense of embarrassment over this. As Richard Fallon
has observed, “Although methodological disputes grow heated
in some cases, it is striking that in the domain of constitutional
adjudication, the [J]ustices have seldom exhibited much
interest in attempting to bind either themselves or each other,
in advance, to the kind of general interpretive approaches that
academic theorists champion.”2
† Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. Thanks to Larry
Alexander, Paula Dalley, Richard Fallon, Shubha Ghosh, Abbe Gluck, Mike Klarman,
Randy Kozel, Art Lefrancois, John Lovett, Kali Murray, Michael O’Hear, CJ Peters,
Ryan Scoville, and Glen Staszewski for comments on earlier drafts, and to audiences at
presentations at the University of Wisconsin Law School, the University of Baltimore
School of Law, and the Loyola University-New Orleans College of Law for their helpful
suggestions. I received incredibly thoughtful comments on this paper, and I am sure
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his close readings of and incisive commentary on multiple drafts.
1 Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, N.Y. MAG., Oct. 6, 2013,
available at http://nymag.com/news/features/antonin-scalia-2013-10/.
2 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Constraints, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 975,
1013 (2009); see also Steven M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation, 72
TEX. L. REV. 1753, 1757 (1994).
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Given the centrality of methodological commitments to at
least some of the Justices’ approach to their jobs, this is
puzzling. Yet the matter rarely surfaces in the Court’s opinions.
Majority opinions often contain language suggesting strong
methodological commitments that later opinions depart from
without acknowledgement.3 A brief exception appeared in
Justice O’Connor’s one-paragraph, partial concurrence in
Michael H. v. Gerald D. She declined to join the due process
analysis in Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion, noting simply, “I
would not foreclose the unanticipated by the prior imposition of
a single mode of historical analysis.”4 Her objection, in other
words, was not to the result of the analysis but rather to the
methodology itself and more specifically to the prospect of
committing to that methodology in future cases.
Apart from stray remarks like Fallon’s, academic
commentators have also left the question of methodological
uniformity in constitutional interpretation alone.5 To be sure,
each theorist’s argument in favor of a particular interpretive
approach is nearly always, implicitly, an argument that everyone
else ought to agree with, and adopt, the theorist’s approach. But
the prospect of interpretive uniformity as a good in its own right
has gone unexamined.
The answer to all this, one might imagine, is simple and is
rooted in the fact that the Supreme Court is a “they” rather than
an “it.”6 The Justices do not attempt to bind one another because
3 See, for example, the discussion of Crawford v. Washington and ensuing
cases in Chad M. Oldfather, Methodological Stare Decisis and Constitutional
Interpretation, in PRECEDENT IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 135, 139-41
(Christopher J. Peters, ed. 2013).
4 491 U.S. 110, 132 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part). The case concerned
a substantive-due-process-based challenge to a California statute creating a presumption
that the husband of a woman who has a child is the father of that child if he is not impotent
or sterile and the couple is living together at the time. Id. at 117-18. In their opinions,
Justices Scalia and Brennan debated the level of generality at which to consult history in
determining whether an asserted liberty interest is one that has been traditionally
protected, such that it can be deemed “fundamental.” Id. at 127 n.6 (Scalia, J.); id. at 139-41
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia advocated in favor of “consulting the most specific
tradition available.” Id. at 127 n.6 (majority opinion) (contending that to do otherwise would
be to countenance arbitrary judicial decision making). “Although assuredly having the
virtue (if it be that) of leaving judges free to decide as they think best when the
unanticipated occurs, a rule of law that binds neither by text nor by any particular,
identifiable tradition is no rule of law at all.” Id. Justice O’Connor joined all of Justice
Scalia’s opinion except for the footnote outlining Scalia’s methodological commitments.
5 Michael Gerhardt has also observed that the Justices have adopted no
fixed methodological framework. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF
PRECEDENT 104-05 (2008).
6 See generally Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary is a They, Not an It: Interpretive
Theory and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549, 550 (2005)
(identifying “the fundamental mistake of overlooking the collective character of judicial
institutions—of overlooking that the judiciary, like Congress, is a ‘they,’ not an ‘it’”).
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they do not want to be bound themselves. Justice Scalia may find
the Justices’ lack of methodological agreement lamentable, but it
is unlikely that he would sign on to a regime of uniformity that
did not comport with his originalist preferences. To agree to
commit to a methodology carries with it the risk that one will
have to commit to someone else’s methodology.
But that cannot be the entire story. There are plenty of
respects in which the Court does act like an “it,” adhering to
past majorities’ decisions even though the present majority
might reach a different conclusion in the absence of the past
decision. Indeed, being bound to reach a result one does not
favor, whether on account of an authoritative text such as a
statute or constitution or a past judicial decision, is a large part
of the judicial role. The justifications for adherence to precedent,
in particular, often center on the rule of law and treating like
cases alike,7 and one might well wonder why the requirement
of treating like cases alike does not extend to methodology.
Judge Robert Bork, at least, thought it does, mocking Justice
O’Connor’s concurrence in Michael H. by opining that
“[a]nother name for the prior adoption of a single mode of
analysis is, of course, ‘the rule of law.’”8
What is more, the Justices do adhere to methodological
commitments in their constitutional decision making. The tiered-
scrutiny framework, for example, can easily be characterized as a
methodology, and one that the Court has consistently embraced.9
And while Planned Parenthood v. Casey’s10 asserted loyalty to Roe
v. Wade11 involved the creation of a new framework for the
assessment of abortion regulations, its “undue burden”
framework has since proven to be relatively durable.12 Chevron
deference to administrative agency interpretations of statutes
provides a third example.13
7 See infra Part I.A.
8 ROBERTH. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 237 (1990).
9 See infra Part II.B.2.
10 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
11 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
12 See, e.g., Neal Devins, How Planned Parenthood v. Casey (Pretty Much)
Settled the Abortion Wars, 118 YALE L.J. 1318, 1322 (2009) (arguing that Casey’s
“standard has proven sufficiently durable as both a judicial and political precedent that
there is no push to change the status quo by the states, Supreme Court Justices, or
either the President or the Senate through the appointments-confirmation process”).
13 See Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as
“Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1911 (2011) [hereinafter Erie]; Abbe
R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological
Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1817 (2010)
[hereinafter Laboratories].
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If we cast our gaze more broadly we see other clear strains
of what we can comfortably characterize as methodological
consistency in the manner in which the Court (and courts more
generally) decides cases. Methodological uncertainty does not
characterize the interpretation of wills or contracts, or the
application of certain canons of statutory construction.14 Yet these
involve the same core task—the interpretation and application of
a written text—as constitutional adjudication. At the broadest
level, there is rough agreement on the types of argumentation
that count as legal. The point is best appreciated by considering
the wide range of methodologies that would be inappropriate. It is
clear, for example, that it would be improper for a court to
resort to a coin flip to decide a case or to trial by ordeal. At a
more specific level, Michael Gerhardt provides an illustrative
list of methodologies that are consistently employed, including
not only the practice of rooting judicial decisions in past opinions
“but also norms (such as avoiding ruling on constitutional issues
whenever possible), historical practices (such as the opening of
legislative sessions with prayer), and traditions (such as
producing opinions for the Court and not seriatim) that the
[J]ustices have deliberately chosen to follow.”15
There is one further development that makes the
question of methodological uniformity in constitutional
interpretation ripe for consideration. In recent years, several
commentators have advocated in favor of the application of stare
decisis to statutory interpretation methodology.16 In fact, as
Abbe Gluck has revealed, many state high courts have adopted
and purport to adhere to statutory interpretation methodology
frameworks.17 Each of those to favor this development has
suggested that the arguments favoring the imposition of
methodological uniformity on statutory interpretation might
transfer to constitutional interpretation, though each is also
careful to note the difference between the two contexts.18
This article has a number of interrelated goals. Its
primary motivation is to tackle the basic issue with which it
opened—explaining the lack of methodological uniformity in
constitutional interpretation. The most natural place to begin
the analysis, particularly given these recent developments in
14 See Erie, supra note 13, at 1970-76 (noting and exploring the implications
of the existence of relatively fixed frameworks in other textual interpretation contexts
for statutory interpretation methodology).
15 GERHARDT, supra note 5, at 3.
16 See infra Part II.A.
17 See generally Laboratories, supra note 13.
18 E.g., Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory
Interpretation Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1872 n.44 (2008).
2014] METHODOLOGICAL PLURALISM 5
the statutory interpretation literature, is with the potential
application of stare decisis. Thus, the analysis begins by taking
the matter up in some detail: first unpacking the justifications
for and mechanisms of stare decisis and then asking why the
same principles of precedent that govern the Court’s substantive
decisions, and that appear to govern some of its methodological
frameworks, do not extend to interpretive methodology. It then
undertakes a more general inquiry into the question of when
courts will consistently adhere to a given methodology, as they
sometimes do, and when they will not. This, in turn, leads to an
effort to provide some conceptual clarity with respect to the
distinction between the application of stare decisis, on the one
hand, and the attainment of methodological consensus on the
other. Finally, it broadens its focus to assess at a more general
level why the Court’s decision making exhibits the pluralism
that it does.
Briefly stated, my conclusions are these. First, stare
decisis and constitutional interpretive methodology are an
uneasy, unstable, and unsustainable combination. Stare decisis
requires a mechanism for assessing the likeness of cases, and
when the meaning of a constitution is at stake its application to
interpretive methodology would require performing this
assessment at a very broad level. Methodologies are applied to
types of documents—contracts, statutes, constitutions—and thus
the most natural measure of likeness in a regime of
methodological stare decisis is the nature of the text being
interpreted. Similarity measured at this level would require that
all documents of a certain type be treated in the same way and
would thereby swamp the lower-level criteria by which likeness is
normally measured. In other words, commitment to interpretive
consistency would require application of the same methodology to
the entire Constitution, or at least to unacceptably broad swaths
of it. Notably, this concern does not arise for less-general
methodological commitments, the kind embodied in what Mitch
Berman has called “constitutional decision rules,”19 such as the
tiered-scrutiny framework.
Second, the inquiry into methodological uniformity is
more properly focused on consensus rather than stare decisis.
Stare decisis, it turns out, is a doctrine that operates in the law’s
transitional zones and with respect to ideas as to which
consensus appears to be developing or dissolving. The court in
Case B, in deciding whether to give stare decisis effect to some
19 See generally Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L.
REV. 1 (2004). For a more complete discussion, see infra Part II.B.2.
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proposition from Case A, will take into account, among other
things, its sense of whether that proposition is likely to garner
sufficiently broad acceptance. Propositions that have reached
the point of wide acceptance or rejection—for instance, deciding
cases by taking into account the reasoning of past decisions
rather than by a coin flip—do not depend on stare decisis to stay
accepted or rejected. By the same token, propositions that are
openly contested, such that the court in Case B will not feel itself
to be bucking an emerging consensus by deciding contrary to
Case A, are beyond the reach of stare decisis. Interpretive
methodology, by and large, remains this sort of battleground.
Third, a broader exploration of the explanations for and
potential justifications of methodological pluralism in
constitutional interpretation reveals three explanations beyond
the sheer impotence of stare decisis. Pluralism might exist
because of a conclusion that it is normatively desirable. It may be,
in other words, that we have achieved consensus on pluralism as
our preferred methodology. Alternatively, pluralism might simply
exist as a default position, the natural result of a world in which
the Justices and other actors in the system disagree about
methodology and have no resort to a mechanism to force their
choices on one another. Finally, the external constraints on the
Court—its inability to force rulings on a sufficiently recalcitrant
public, for example—are also likely to play a role.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows: Part I
takes up in some detail the question of whether stare decisis
can or ought to be applied to interpretive methodology in the
constitutional context. It begins with a general exploration of
the justifications for and mechanisms of stare decisis and moves
to consideration of its application in the context of constitutional
law. Part II takes up the prospect of methodological stare decisis.
It examines the idea in general, and then in the specific contexts
of statutory and constitutional interpretive methodology. Part III
broadens the inquiry, exploring three categories of explanations
for the methodological pluralism that characterizes the Court’s
interpretive practice.
I. STARE DECISIS AND THE CONSTITUTION
Imagine that, a decade from now, the Supreme Court
takes a Second Amendment case. Imagine further that the Court
has not decided any Second Amendment cases in the intervening
time. The Court that confronts this new Second Amendment
case is not the same Court, in terms of its personnel, as the one
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that decided District of Columbia v. Heller.20 The Justices who
were in Heller’s majority, and the new Justices with similar
jurisprudential inclinations, now constitute a minority of the
Court. The Court’s new majority, were it confronted with Heller
anew, would come out the other way.
But because it would not be confronting Heller anew, the
majority that I have described would have to grapple with the
matter of stare decisis. Its view is that Heller was wrongly
decided, most likely in the sense that the case incorrectly
recognized or characterized an individual right to bear arms.
That belief, standing alone, is not enough to justify an
overruling. Stare decisis, or precedent (the terms are, for most
purposes, synonymous), creates a presumption in favor of
adherence to past cases, even if the current court regards them
as wrongly decided.21 At the same time, however, “stare decisis is
not . . . [an] inexorable command.”22 Instead, its application
entails consideration of a cluster of prudential factors including
the workability of the rule of law created in the past case(s), the
nature and extent of the reliance interests that have grown up
around it, and whether understandings of related areas of law or
facts in the world have developed in such a way as to undercut
the past case’s foundations.23 The Court would accordingly not be
required to adhere to Heller, but stare decisis operates to tip the
balance in favor of adherence rather than departure.24
If the Court finds it necessary to address stare decisis in
its opinion, a discussion concerning the matters just identified is
likely to constitute the entirety of its analysis. Yet we might ask
another question. Assuming that the Court concludes that it
should adhere to Heller’s substantive holding, must it also
continue to adhere to its methodology?25 Justice Scalia’s opinion
for the Court in Heller, you will recall, offered a thoroughly
originalist analysis. Is that methodological choice entitled to
20 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
21 Indeed, stare decisis does work only in those cases in which the current
court regards a past decision as wrong. If the current court regards the past decision as
correct, then it does not need the extra reason to adhere to it provided by stare decisis.
See infra Part I.B.1.
22 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
23 See infra Part I.C.
24 This depiction is, of course, artificially binary, for there are all sorts of
ways in which the new majority could claim to follow Heller while implementing it in a
way that is considerably narrower than what the original majority would have done.
25 The discussion in the article assumes a distinction between methodology
and substance. The usefulness of the distinction seems self-evident, though the line
between the two categories is undoubtedly blurry. Cf. Mark Tushnet, “Meet the New
Boss”: The New Judicial Center, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1205, 1207 (2005) (analyzing the
Court’s treatment of “two not entirely distinct classes: method and substance”).
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precedential effect? Did the Heller Court, in other words, decide
not merely what the Second Amendment means, but also how it
will analyze questions that arise under the Second Amendment?
Descriptively, of course, the answer to those questions is
“no.”26 The Justices have never acted as though they are bound
by the methodological choices of the Court’s past decisions—
witness Griswold v. Connecticut’s lonely embrace of penumbral
reasoning27—and consequently it would not be surprising were
the majority in our hypothetical case to claim fealty to Heller
while engaging in an originalism-free analysis.
The question then becomes, why? The answer requires a
return to first principles. Stare decisis is, of course, the
characteristic method of the common law. Indeed, the common
law can exist only because of an expectation that courts will be
bound by their prior decisions. Only in this way can a collection
of past decisions coalesce into a body of law. As Gerhardt puts it,
“Precedent is the only medium of exchange in the common
law.”28 Stare decisis is also a feature of constitutional
adjudication, and while it is of course not the sole source of
authority in that context, much of constitutional law has a
common-law feel.29 Thus, the case for its application to
methodology seems intuitive. Intuition often misleads, however,
and our analysis must accordingly begin with consideration of
the underpinnings and nature of stare decisis in its traditional,
substantive sense. We thus start by considering stare decisis as
a general matter, both in terms of its justifications and the
mechanisms by which it works, before turning to the workings of
the doctrine in constitutional law.
26
Depending on the context, the Court will sometimes favor one form of
argument, but at other times favor others. As a consequence, any
metaprinciple [that mediates among conflicting arguments] likely will be
descriptively inaccurate. Putting the matter somewhat differently, adherence
to any a priori sensible metaprinciple will require the overruling of a good
deal of existing case law.
Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The
Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1787 (1997).
27 It may be more appropriate to say that Griswold is the only opinion in
which the Court has openly embraced penumbral reasoning. As Brannon Denning and
Glenn Reynolds have suggested, that style of analysis has appeared elsewhere in the
Court’s cases. See generally Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Comfortably
Penumbral, 77 B.U. L. REV. 1089 (1998).
28 GERHARDT, supra note 5, at 97.
29 See infra Part I.C.
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A. The Justifications for Stare Decisis
In order to determine whether stare decisis ought to
apply to interpretive methodology, we must first pin down the
purposes that stare decisis serves. There are four primary
justifications for the doctrine: (1) treating like cases alike, (2)
enhancing the predictability of law, (3) strengthening judicial
decision making, and (4) furthering stability. There is a vast
jurisprudential literature exploring the nature and implications of
these justifications.30 For our purposes, a brief overview will suffice.
1. Treating Like Cases Alike
It is easy to see how adherence to a regime of precedent
facilitates the like treatment of like cases. Indeed, one could
argue that stare decisis is necessary to the treatment of like
cases. If Case A, involving facts X, Y, and Z, is resolved in one
manner, then that alone is a reason to resolve Case B, also
involving facts X, Y, and Z, in the same manner. This may be
desirable for deontological reasons, on the ground that such
equivalent treatment is “a good in its own right.”31 There are
also consequentialist versions of this justification, which draw
their strength from values such as impartiality, consistency,
and the satisfaction of parties’ reliance interests.32 With respect
to the latter, consistent treatment of cases enables those who
must comply with the law to structure their affairs to do so
with confidence that their situation will be treated the same as
similar situations that arose in the past. An important
presupposition here is that there is an appropriate metric for
assessing likeness. Cases A and B might share facts X, Y, and
Z, but that overlap does not necessarily mean they are alike,
depending on the perceived significance of other facts they do
not share. As we will see, this becomes an important factor in
considering the workability and appropriateness of methodological
stare decisis.33
30 In addition to the authorities cited below, see, e.g., BRIAN BIX,
JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 156-57 (5th ed. 2009) (providing suggested
additional reading).
31 NEIL DUXBURY, THENATURE AND AUTHORITY OF PRECEDENT 170-71 (2008). For
a critique of deontological justifications of precedent, see Christopher J. Peters, Foolish
Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and Justice in Stare Decisis, 105 YALEL.J. 2031 (1996).
32 DUXBURY, supra note 31, at 156-67; Peters, supra note 31, at 2039-40.
33 See infra Part II.B.
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2. Predictability
Predictability interests are related to, but distinct from,
reliance interests and are similarly focused on the interests of the
parties to which the law applies, as well as to other actors within
the system with an interest in having confident knowledge of
what the courts will do. Parties structuring transactions, lawyers
in litigation, lower-court judges deciding cases, and legislatures
crafting statutes all have an interest in being able to predict what
a future court is likely to do.34 Stare decisis facilitates this by
legitimizing an expectation of continuity between past and
future decisions.
3. Strengthened Decision Making
Stare decisis can strengthen the decision-making
process in two ways. First, an express mechanism for reliance
on past cases makes the process of deciding more efficient.
Rather than having to rethink each aspect of its decision from
first principles, the deciding court can use the results of past
decisions as a starting point and undertake its analysis from
there. Not only does this save time but it helps minimize error,
in the sense that the collective wisdom of past courts embodied
in their decisions is more likely to be right than would be a
single, present court’s reasoning from scratch.35 Second, this
may in turn affect perceptions of the decision-making
institution, creating the appearance of similarity amongst
courts over time even where that similarity may be illusory.
The effect is to portray judicial institutions as standardized,
which furthers the perception that courts decide cases
according to external legal standards rather than as a product
of personal preference.36
4. Stability
A regime of stare decisis necessarily facilitates some
amount of stability. An expectation that courts will regard
themselves as bound by their, or their predecessors’, past
decisions is also an expectation that courts will not radically
change course. That sort of stability is likely (though not
34 DUXBURY, supra note 31, at 162.
35 See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 599 (1987).
36 See id. at 600.
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necessarily in all contexts) a social good in its own right, and it
also contributes to the mechanisms identified above.37
B. The Mechanisms of Stare Decisis
Several features of the operation of stare decisis bear on
the consideration of its application to interpretive methodology.
As we will see, it matters that stare decisis has its true effect
only in cases in which a court believes (or at least suspects)
that a prior decision was incorrect. The doctrine requires resort
to some mechanism for assessing similarity between cases for
its application, and when it does, applies in a scalar rather
than an absolute fashion. In combination, these aspects of how
stare decisis works reveal another feature of its operation,
namely that it applies only in transitional zones. Put
differently, much of what we regard as settled law is that way
not because of stare decisis, but because of the breadth of our
underlying agreement. This will turn out to be significant, for
the simple reason that we lack the necessary underlying
agreement concerning the appropriateness of various
interpretive methods.
1. The Necessary Connection to Wrongly Decided Cases
Common usage of the term “precedent” obscures an
important feature of its application, which is that it does most,
if not all, of its work in cases where the deciding court believes
that the decision on which it is being asked to rely was wrongly
decided, or at least entertains some uncertainty concerning
whether the prior decision was correct.38 To be sure, the word is
often used to refer to a body of clearly established doctrine, as
in “there is ample precedent in support of” some doctrinal
proposition. Used in that sense, however, the assertion is that
the proposition at issue is not one that can reasonably be
questioned. The reference is accordingly not to a situation in
37 See id. at 602; see also Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and
Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 744-46 (1988) (discussing the
agenda-limiting function of stare decisis).
38 See BIX, supra note 30, at 153 (“precedent is only of crucial importance when
the prior case was wrongly decided (or at least could have been decided in a different way
with equal legitimacy)”); Larry Alexander, Constrained By Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1,
4 (1989); Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 909 n.108
(2006) (“Precedents that exert decisional force only when they are perceived to be correct
have no weight qua precedents. Only if the essence of precedential constraint is
understood to be content independent, and thus only if precedents constrain (even if only
presumptively) even when they are perceived as mistaken by the subsequently deciding
court, does the force of precedent have genuine bite.”).
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which the notion of precedent, as a doctrinal or less tangible
jurisprudential matter, has any constraining effect on the
court. Consider a court faced with Case B, which it regards as
falling within the precedential scope of existing Case A. If the
court believes that Case A was correctly decided, such that it
would also decide Case A in the same way, which is in turn
consistent with its belief concerning how Case B should be
decided, then its decision in Case B would be the same
regardless of whether Case A existed. The court would likely
cite Case A in support of its decision. But because the existence
of Case A would not affect the substance of the decision, its
citation would, in essence, serve as window dressing.
The same holds true if the existing authority consists not
merely of Case A, but of a large number of past cases standing
for the same proposition. In this scenario it is less likely that the
court will give much thought to the question of whether the past
cases were correctly decided. In that sense the court could
perhaps be described as regarding itself as bound to follow those
cases even if they were wrongly decided, while not itself having
a considered view of whether they were in fact wrongly decided.
As this suggests, there is no sharp break involved, no point past
which a proposition goes from fixed in place because of stare
decisis to so widely accepted that it is beyond dispute. Nor are
the processes completely distinct. The factors that contribute to
general acceptance may include the sorts of considerations that
drive stare decisis. But at some point a proposition stands on a
sufficiently deep consensus understanding of law and the
various social and cultural factors on which it rests that it could
not be otherwise. At that point a court’s adherence to that
proposition is not a product of stare decisis.
This in turn means that a necessary consequence of
stare decisis is that it will generate some bad decisions.
Because the doctrine does work only in cases where the
deciding court disagrees with precedent, some of the decisions
that result are likely to be “bad” as assessed from a current
vantage point. This is because reliance on precedent is a way of
invoking a legal rule and therefore presents the same problems
of over- and underinclusiveness that inhere in any use of a
legal rule.39 Simply put, because all legal rules depend for their
application on the presence or absence of a few specified factors
and foreclose consideration of the rest of the universe of
pertinent facts, they will sometimes generate results that differ
39 See e.g., Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 645, 646 (1991).
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from those that would be reached by a fully informed decision
maker. Case B may come within the precedential scope of Case
A, but only because the proposition for which Case A stands
does not take into account the presence or absence of Fact X,
which in a perfect world might be grounds for a distinction.
2. The Need to Assess Similarity
Implementation of stare decisis requires some
mechanism for knowing when a given present case falls within
the precedential scope of a prior case.40 Stare decisis is an
essentially analogical form of reasoning, requiring courts to
determine when a present case is sufficiently similar to a past
case to create the presumption that the past case serves as
authority governing the present one.41 Put differently, an
obligation to treat like cases alike requires some mechanism by
which to determine what “like cases” are.
The problem arises because no two cases are identical.
Some of their differences or similarities will be consequential,
others will not. Moreover, these differences and similarities can
be assessed at varying levels of generality. Karl Llewellyn
suggested that there are two doctrines of precedent, a narrow
view by which those seeking to limit the reach of a past case
will regard it as involving “redheaded Walpoles in pale
magenta Buick cars,” and a broad view that accepts all
statements in a past opinion as authoritative “[n]o matter how
broad the statement, no matter how unnecessary on the facts,
or the procedural issues.”42 But these are merely points on a
spectrum. A court might regard the appropriate scope of the
case as encompassing, toward the broad end, “cars” or
“unusually colored cars” or “American cars.”
The determinations are consequential. Llewllyn meant
“redheaded Walpoles . . . ” as an example of a court
distinguishing a precedent away. The case would continue to
have precedential effect in the formal sense that it had not
been overruled, but the scope of its applicability would have
been so reduced as to render it toothless. The more general the
basis on which a past case’s precedential effect is grounded, the
greater the range of future cases in which it will provide
restraint. “Cars” is a larger category than “Buicks,” and a
court’s choice of which of these concepts a past case was about
40 Schauer, supra note 35, at 578.
41 DUXBURY, supra note 31, at 2.
42 K. N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 63-65 (1930).
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will be a choice about how many future cases it wishes to
attempt to influence.
The criteria that courts use to assess similarity are not
self-generating, nor are they products of reasoning that is
internal to law. As Frederick Schauer has demonstrated, these
criteria—the “rules of relevance” for assessing similarity and
the “categories of assimilation” they produce—are contingent.43
The fact that both Case A and Case B involve cars, for example,
might matter or it might not and whether it does will depend
not only on the contours of the relevant legal standards but
also on linguistic and cultural factors that are external to the
law. It is a complex process that requires consideration of the
nature of the legal right or responsibility at issue and its
relation to the various categories into which we divide the
world. “Cars” versus “American cars” might matter if the legal
rule concerns jurisdiction over a manufacturer, for example, in
a way that it probably would not were the case about liability
for traffic accidents.
3. The Scalar Nature of Stare Decisis
Precedent’s authority is not binary, but rather scalar—it
exerts an incremental rather than all-or-nothing force.44 As we
have seen, stare decisis does work only in cases where the
deciding court regards an applicable past case as having been
wrongly decided, or at least harbors suspicions that it was
wrongly decided. But the mere fact that the court in Case B
concludes that it falls within the precedential scope of Case A
does not mean that the court will feel compelled to follow Case
A if it believes that Case A was wrongly decided. The court has
the option, in appropriate cases, to overrule itself. As Neil
Duxbury puts the point, “the reality is that precedents, unlike
statutes, do not bind judges in an all-or-nothing fashion, that
the binding force of a precedent is best explained not in terms
of its validity (this being a non-scalar concept) but in terms of
its authority (of which there can be degrees).”45 The doctrine’s
ability to constrain is therefore both limited and provisional.
Courts are restrained, but they are not irrevocably bound, and
the restraints exist subject to conditions. So, it is that one often
sees references to a court’s ability to depart from precedent
being conditioned not merely on a determination that a past
43 Schauer, supra note 35, at 578, 582 (emphasis omitted).
44 DUXBURY, supra note 31, at 23-24.
45 Id. at 23.
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case was wrongly decided, but on such a conclusion reached
with a reasonable degree of confidence and coupled with the
further conclusion that more harm would result from continued
adherence to the past decision than from a change.46
Significantly, the strength of precedent’s force varies by
context. The Supreme Court, for example, is quite open about
the fact that it gives greater stare decisis effect to its statutory
construction decisions than its constitutional decisions.47 The
reason, of course, is the comparative difficulty of amending the
Constitution as compared to statutes. Because it is more
difficult for an “erroneous” constitutional ruling, the Court
must regard itself as more open to reconsidering its decisions.48
4. Stare Decisis as a Transitional Doctrine
Taken together, these mechanisms reveal an aspect of
stare decisis that is not typically highlighted, namely that it is
a doctrine that comes into play only in the law’s transitional
areas. The interests advanced by stare decisis are considerable
and its prescription of consistency in the face of uncertainty
about the merits of a doctrine has wide application. But at a
certain point the stare decisis-based rules for adherence are
outweighed by larger forces of social consensus. This may lead
to our regarding the proposition in question as clearly correct
and thus something to honor apart from stare decisis, or clearly
wrong and thus to be rejected despite stare decisis.49
46 See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Precedent, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 503, 512 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1999) (“[I]n order for a
constrained court to overrule a horizontal precedent, the precedent must be more than
wrong: it must be both wrong and also mischievous to a certain degree of gravity.”);
HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, M.A., HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS 10
(1912) (“It is the duty of a court of last resort to abide by its own former decisions, and not
to depart from or vary them unless entirely satisfied, in the first place, that they were
wrongly decided, and, in the second place, that less mischief will result from their
overthrow than from their perpetuation.”); John Hanna, The Role of Precedent in Judicial
Decision, 2 VILL. L. REV. 367, 368 (1957) (“The general American doctrine as applied to
courts of last resort is that a court is not inexorably bound by its own precedents but will
follow the rule of law which it has established in earlier cases, unless clearly convinced
that the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing
conditions and that more good than harm will come by departing from precedent.”).
47 See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
48 See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
49 Justice Cardozo made a similar observation:
My analysis of the judicial process comes then to this, and little more: logic,
and history, and custom, and utility, and the accepted standards of right
conduct, are the forces which singly or in combination shape the progress of
the law. Which of these forces shall dominate in any case, must depend
largely upon the comparative importance or value of the social interests that
will be thereby promoted or impaired. One of the most fundamental social
interests is that law shall be uniform and impartial. There must be nothing
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To expand on the point, if a proposition of law is so
widely accepted that a court would not think to question it,
then the court would not regard a past decision based on that
proposition as wrong. Thus it is acceptance, rather than stare
decisis, that leads courts to consistently apply that proposition.
For example, it is not Marbury v. Madison50 that compels our
continued acceptance of judicial review, but rather it is our
continued acceptance of judicial review as an established
feature of our government that enables the continuation of the
practice.51 Were judicial review to fall out of favor, so would
Marbury. Legal propositions that are so widely rejected that no
court would even think to adopt them are likewise beyond the
reach of stare decisis.
It is only where there is, or has been, some question as
to the appropriateness—and thus acceptance—of a legal rule
that precedent comes into play.52 Propositions that are widely
contested will also remain outside the pull of stare decisis. If a
majority of a subsequent court disagrees with a proposition of
law and feels sufficiently strongly about it, the doctrine is not
strong enough to forestall an overruling. Stare decisis will,
however, preserve the existence of those propositions where the
subsequent court senses that either the breadth or strength of
in its action that savors of prejudice or favor or even arbitrary whim or fitfulness.
Therefore in the main there shall be adherence to precedent. There shall be
symmetrical development, consistently with history or custom when history or
custom has been the motive force, or the chief one, in giving shape to existing
rules, and with logic or philosophy when the motive power has been theirs. But
symmetrical development may be bought at too high a price. Uniformity ceases to
be a good when it becomes uniformity of oppression. The social interest served by
symmetry or certainty must then be balanced against the social interest served by
equity and fairness or other elements of social welfare. These may enjoin upon the
judge the duty of drawing the line at another angle, of staking the path along new
courses, of marking a new point of departure from which others who come after
him will set out upon their journey.
BENJAMINN. CARDOZO, THENATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112-13 (1921).
50 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
51 This is merely an example of the broader notion that it is some version of
acceptance that legitimates the Constitution in its entirety. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1792, 1803-04 (2005)
[hereinafter Legitimacy]; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An
Essay on Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 585-87 (2001) [hereinafter
Stare Decisis]; Richard S. Kay, The Illegality of the Constitution, 4 CONST. COMMENT.
57, 57 (1987); Frederick Schauer, Precedent and the Necessary Externality of
Constitutional Norms, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 45, 55 (1994).
52
The common law in its ultimate origin was merely the custom of the King’s
courts; the regular routine which they developed in the administration of
justice became settled and known, and therefore served as the basis upon which
people could forecast with some certainty the future decisions of the courts.
THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISEHISTORY OF THECOMMON LAW 342 (5th ed. 1956).
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disagreement does not reach the threshold for overruling. The
endeavor is, for the most part, tentative and incremental in
nature.53 Sometimes the court in Case A will simply have
gotten it wrong, perhaps through simple miscalculation,
perhaps through a failure to appreciate that Case A was in
some meaningful way not representative of the class of cases of
which it is a part, such that the rule appropriate for its
resolution is not the right rule for the class as a whole.54
Sometimes the world will have changed in the interim, such
that Case A reached the right result for its time, but the wrong
result for Case B. Stare decisis is designed to allow for changes
of course in such situations. A decision might be narrowed,
extended, overturned, or ignored, and there is no reliable way
to tell ex ante which will be the case. Over time, the process
enables a series of courts to test and refine rules and principles
over a large number of cases. Individual decisions coalesce into
general rules, which over time may coalesce into principles.55
The scalar nature of precedent allows it to accommodate
these shifts. This is, of course, a necessary feature of common-
law adjudication, for without it, the law could not evolve. In the
common law, there is a connection between the application of a
potentially precedential rule and the social consensus that
underlies the rule, and doctrinal propositions are only as good
as their congruence with broader social propositions.56 A court
confronted with a recent decision that it does not agree with,
but that it does not regard as so wrong as to have been
generally rejected, is more likely to adhere to it. A court faced
with a longstanding—and previously unquestioned—legal rule
that it believes is falling (or has fallen) out of favor is more
likely to let it stand for a bit longer. Categories of assimilation,
53 BIX, supra note 30, at 154-55.
54 See Chad M. Oldfather, Universal De Novo Review, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
308, 339-50 (2009); Schauer, supra note 38, at 884.
55 See BIX, supra note 30, at 155.
56
The announced rule of a precedent should be applied and extended to new cases
if the rule substantially satisfies the standard of social congruence and a failure
to apply or extend the rule to a new case would not be justified by applicable
social propositions, given the social propositions that support the rule.
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 75 (1991); Cf. Gerald J.
Postema, Philosophy of the Common Law, in THEOXFORDHANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE
AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 588, 590 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) (describing
the classical, common-law view, in which “[l]aw was regarded not as a structured set of
authoritatively posited, explicit norms, but as rules and ways implicit in a body of
practices and patterns of practical thinking all ‘handed down by tradition, use, [and]
experience.’ These rules were the product of a process of a common practice of deliberative
reasoning, and constituted the basic raw materials used in it”) (citation omitted).
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too, will change with time and culture, and their evolution will
help to move certain ideas into and out of the transitional zone
in which stare decisis applies. Thus, the doctrinal terrain
covered by stare decisis will shift as the principles and social
propositions underlying law shift, such that various legal
propositions will go from established-beyond-question to
established-but-questionable (and thus subject to the doctrine
of precedent) to out-of-favor and vice-versa.57 At times the effect
is mediated somewhat by the existence of a higher source of
authority, such as a statute or constitution, but the dynamic
can still play out within the narrower range of play allowed in
those contexts.
The consequence is that the zones I have described—
generally accepted, generally rejected, openly contested, and
the transitional realm of stare decisis—are not fixed but are in
a constant state of flux. Propositions that were once widely
rejected, such as claims against discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation, are questioned first in society and then in
law. Case-by-case adjudication allows the transition to occur
(its role is often less significant than that of legislation, but it is
real nonetheless) but in a way that lets the courts take small
steps as they grapple with how to fit the change into existing
frameworks. And while often referred to as a “ratchet,”58 the
noncategorical nature in which it binds allows for movement in
the other direction as well. Propositions that were once widely
accepted—the inequality of women or African-Americans, for
example—fall under question. When the initial questions arise,
stare decisis holds the decisions based on the propositions in
place until such time as it becomes sufficiently clear that the
propositions have been rejected, at which point the decisions
embodying those ideas are overturned. The issues are rarely so
monumental, of course, but even so, stare decisis provides a
vehicle for the orderly evolution of the law by adjudication.
57 Cf. Roscoe Pound, Address, Survey of the Conference Problems, 14 U. CIN.
L. REV. 324 (1940). Among other relevant observations, Pound referred to a study he
performed that revealed:
that the general run of rules of law had a life of simply one generation. Fifty
years is a long life for a rule, that is, a legal precept that attaches a definite
legal consequence to a definite detailed state of facts. And it is with rules, very
largely, that this doctrine of stare decisis has it [sic] immediate application.
Id. at 329.
58 For a discussion of the “ratchet” effect of stare decisis, see Lawrence B.
Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism,
and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 193-94 (2006).
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C. Stare Decisis and Constitutional Law
There is one significant sense in which stare decisis in
constitutional adjudication differs in its application from other
contexts, and that is its force. Because the Constitution is so
difficult to amend, the Court has acknowledged that it feels
more freedom to overrule its constitutional precedents than
their statutory counterparts.59 Apart from this crucial
distinction, operation of stare decisis in constitutional law
largely parallels its operation elsewhere. Indeed, despite the
theoretical centrality of the text of the Constitution to the
endeavor, constitutional law is to a much greater degree about
past cases than it is about the document.60 Justice Scalia has
lamented the fact that, for most any question of constitutional
law, “[t]he starting point of the analysis will be Supreme Court
cases, and the . . . issue will presumptively be decided
according to the logic that those cases expressed, with no
regard for how far that logic, thus extended, has distanced us
from the original text and understanding.”61 This situation was
not inevitable. The Constitution was itself a document without
59 See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989)
(“We have said also that the burden borne by the party advocating the abandonment of
an established precedent is greater where the Court is asked to overrule a point of
statutory construction. Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of
statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation,
the legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we have
done.” (emphasis omitted)).
As one authority puts it:
It is easy to state some highly general normative propositions about the role of
stare decisis in constitutional adjudication that would probably draw wide
agreement. First, the Court should ordinarily afford its constitutional precedents
some weight, not treating them ab initio as if the issues they decided were
matters of first impression. Second, however, precedents rarely, if ever, foreclose
the possibility of their own reconsideration and possible overruling, limitation, or
extension. Third, because it is far harder to amend the Constitution than to
amend a statute, the Court should be readier to correct what it sees as an
erroneous constitutional ruling than to overrule a statutory interpretation.
MICHAEL J. GERHARDT ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND
PERSPECTIVES 383 (3d ed. 2007).
60 Three decades ago Harry Jones observed that “American constitutional law
is essentially case law, a system in which the decisions of the Supreme Court and other
courts are guided and structured by precedent.” Harry W. Jones, Dyson Distinguished
Lecture: Precedent and Policy in Constitutional Law, 4 PACE L. REV. 11, 13 (1983).
More recently, Andrew Wistrich remarked, “In the realm of constitutional law, common
law precedents are more dog than tail.” Andrew J. Wistrich, The Evolving Temporality
of Lawmaking, 44 CONN. L. REV. 737, 760 (2012). David Strauss has, of course,
suggested that common-law methodology provides the best methodological alternative
to originalism and textualism. See generally David A. Strauss, Common Law
Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996).
61 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 39 (1997).
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precedent, and thus the Framers may not have had a clear
sense of whether judicial applications of it would have
precedential effect.62 Consistent with this, the document makes
no express mention of the concept of precedent, and its textual
hook, if there is one, must be extracted from Article III’s
references to “the judicial power.”63 Even so, the Supreme Court
has engaged in precedential reasoning from the beginning,64
and citation to and reliance upon past decisions is a feature of
nearly all of the Court’s opinions.
At this point in the analysis it is useful to recall that the
Court is ultimately a collection of individual Justices—a “they”
rather than an “it.”65 While it is possible in some instances to
speak of “the Court” as having accepted certain doctrines or
practices, it is often the case that the positions of the individual
Justices have not coalesced around a single point of view. So it is
with stare decisis. Invocation of the concept has occurred
consistently enough through the Court’s history that we can
legitimately speak of “the Court” having consistently relied on it.
At the same time, as we will see, the Justices have debated
particulars amongst themselves, articulating differing views
concerning how stare decisis is to be conceived and implemented.
In this sense, the evolution of stare decisis parallels the
development of substantive doctrines. Stare decisis, as applied
to constitutional decision making, is widely accepted. Even so,
although resort to precedent is longstanding, the practice of
precedential reasoning has changed. Over the first century-and-a-
quarter of its existence, the Supreme Court’s reliance on stare
decisis took the form of abstract references, as contrasted with the
relatively developed caselaw that it invokes today.66 As a matter
of doctrine, Colin Starger has traced the Court’s modern
pronouncements on stare decisis back to Justice Brandeis’s
62 “Prior to the drafting and ratification of the Constitution, Americans had
little, if any, meaningful experience with constitutional adjudication. The Framers and
Ratifiers had firsthand experience with common law precedents, but not with
constitutional ones; they had no precedent for handling constitutional precedents.”
GERHARDT, supra note 5, at 48.
63 U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2. For articulations of this position, see, e.g.,
Jennifer M. Bandy, Note, Interpretive Freedom: A Necessary Component of Article III
Judging, 61 DUKE L.J. 651 (2011); Fallon, Stare Decisis, supra note 51, at 577 (“Article
III’s grant of ‘the judicial Power’ authorizes the Supreme Court to elaborate and rely on a
principle of stare decisis and, more generally, to treat precedent as a constituent element
of constitutional adjudication.”). This was, at base, the argument underlying the Eighth
Circuit’s short-lived holding that unpublished opinions are unconstitutional. Anastasoff v.
United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated, 235 F.3d 1054 (2000) (en banc).
64 See Colin Starger, The Dialectic of Stare Decisis Doctrine, in PRECEDENT IN
THEUNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, supra note 3.
65 See Vermeule, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
66 Id.
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dissent in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.67 Burnet is best
known as the source of Brandeis’s famous remark justifying stare
decisis on the ground that “in most matters it is more important
that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled
right.”68 Brandeis also described a doctrine that is not “a
universal, inexorable command” and one that ought to apply with
less force to constitutional rulings for the simple reason that they
are “practically impossible” to correct through amendment.69
The Court’s most prominent articulation of the role of
stare decisis in constitutional decision making came in the joint
opinion of Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, and Souter in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey.70 The joint opinion
opened its discussion of stare decisis by describing the doctrine
as “indispensable”71 to the rule of law under the Constitution.
But it then immediately offered Brandeis’s qualification and
noted that, in reviewing its past holdings, the Court’s
“judgment is customarily informed by a series of prudential
and pragmatic considerations designed to test the consistency
of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law,
and to gauge the respective costs of reaffirming and overruling
a prior case.”72 Consistent with that, the joint opinion analyzed
the question of whether to overturn Roe v. Wade in terms of
Roe’s workability, the extent to which reliance interests had
developed around it, the existence of inconsistent developments
in related areas of the law, and changes in either the
underlying factual setting or our understanding of it.73 Having
concluded that this “normal stare decisis analysis” supported
continued adherence to Roe, the joint opinion noted that that
would normally end the matter. “But the sustained and
widespread debate Roe has provoked calls for some comparison
between that case and others of comparable dimension that
have responded to national controversies and taken on the
impress of the controversies addressed.”74 The two cases it had
in mind were West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,75 which, in
67 285 U.S. 393, 405 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). For a detailed and
insightful history of the development of stare decisis doctrine in the Supreme Court,
see Starger, supra note 64.
68 Burnet, 285 U.S. at 406.
69 Id. at 405-07.
70 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
71 “Indeed, the very concept of the rule of law underlying our own
Constitution requires such continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by
definition, indispensable.” Id. at 854.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 854-55.
74 Id. at 861.
75 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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overruling Adkins v. Children’s Hospital,76 signaled the end of
the Lochner era, and Brown v. Board of Education,77 which, of
course, overruled Plessy v. Ferguson.78 In these two cases,
overruling was appropriate:
West Coast Hotel and Brown each rested on facts, or an
understanding of facts, changed from those which furnished the
claimed justifications for the earlier constitutional resolutions. Each
case was comprehensible as the Court’s response to facts that the
country could understand, or had come to understand already, but
which the Court of an earlier day, as its own declarations disclosed,
had not been able to perceive. As the decisions were thus
comprehensible they were also defensible, not merely as the victories
of one doctrinal school over another by dint of numbers (victories
though they were), but as applications of constitutional principle to
facts as they had not been seen by the Court before. In constitutional
adjudication as elsewhere in life, changed circumstances may impose
new obligations, and the thoughtful part of the Nation could accept
each decision to overrule a prior case as a response to the Court’s
constitutional duty.79
Such a change was not present, the joint opinion concluded,
with respect to Roe. Because “a decision to overrule should rest
on some special reason over and above the belief that a prior
case was wrongly decided,”80 the joint opinion concluded that
Roe should survive.
More recently, the Court’s opinions in Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission81 included a dispute over the
proper contours of stare decisis doctrine. Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion articulated an approach that overlapped but
was not coextensive with Casey. In addition to workability,
reliance, and the lessons of experience, the opinion’s standard
required inquiry into “‘the antiquity of the precedent . . . and of
course whether the decision was well reasoned.’”82 Justice
Stevens took issue with this last part of the formulation or at
least with its application in Citizens United.83 The two opinions
thus reflect differing positions in a doctrinal debate over the
nature of stare decisis as applied to constitutional law.84
76 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379 (1937).
77 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
78 163 U.S. 537 (1896), abrogated by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
79 Casey, 505 U.S. at 863-64.
80 Id. at 864.
81 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
82 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 363 (quoting Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S.
778, 792-93 (2009)).
83 558 U.S. at 409 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
84 See Starger, supra note 64, at 19-21, 29.
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Although the Justices quarrel over the particulars of the
application of stare decisis—that is, at the margins of the
doctrine “they” have different views—it seems fair to say that
“the Court,” as an “it,” accepts the existence of stare decisis as a
doctrinal matter, and consequently the common-law character of
constitutional law.85 The only quarrel with the view that the
Court ought to regard itself as bound (in the non-absolute,
scalar sense noted above) by its past decisions comes from
those who espouse a certain strand of originalism. Briefly, and
somewhat simplistically stated, that view holds that it is the
Constitution as originally enacted and duly amended that is
the supreme law of the land, and not judicial interpretations of
the Constitution.86 Because the Constitution can be amended
only in accordance with the provisions of Article V, a Court
that followed a prior case that departed from original
understanding would be elevating a judicial decision over the
Constitution and thereby countenancing what is in effect an
improper amendment by judicial fiat.87 On the Court, only
Justice Thomas has expressed sympathy with this view.88
Underlying these two visions of precedent are differing
conceptions of constitutional legitimacy. The view that would
deny the legitimacy of stare decisis is rooted in a contractual
85 The analogy between the common law and the use of precedent in
constitutional adjudication can be overdrawn. Michael Gerhardt argues that these two
types of adjudication employ precedent in different ways, owing to the fact that
precedent constitutes the entire universe of legal authority in a common law case,
whereas in constitutional cases “arguments may be based not only on precedent, but
also on other conventional modes of constitutional discourse—text, original meaning,
structure, moral reasoning, and consequences.” GERHARDT, supra note 5, at 96-97.
86 See Dorf, supra note 26, at 1766 (describing originalism as resting on an
underlying social contract theory of the Constitution pursuant to which “unelected judges
may displace legislative decisions in the name of the Constitution, but only because the
Constitution is a social contract to which consent was validly given through ratification”).
87 See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 25, 27-28 (1994) (“If the Constitution says X and a prior
judicial decision says Y, a court has not merely the power, but the obligation, to prefer
the Constitution.”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of
Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289, 289 (2005) (“If one is an originalist—that is, if one
believes that the Constitution should be understood and applied in accordance with the
objective meaning that the words and phrases would have had to an informed general
public at the time of their adoption—then stare decisis, understood as a theory of
adhering to prior judicial precedents that are contrary to the original public meaning,
is completely irreconcilable with originalism.” (internal citation omitted)).
88 For example: “I write separately to observe that our case law has drifted
far from the original understanding of the Commerce Clause. In a future case, we
ought to temper our Commerce Clause jurisprudence in a manner that both makes
sense of our more recent case law and is more faithful to the original understanding of
that Clause.” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
This has not been Justice Scalia’s position. See Randy Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A
Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 13-16 (2006).
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conception of the Constitution.89 On this view the document’s
status as supreme law stems from the procedures of its
ratification.90 The Constitution is legitimate because it was
enacted pursuant to those procedures, and interpretations of
the Constitution are legitimate only insofar as they are
consistent with the document as it was enacted or modified in
accordance with its terms. On one version of this view, it entails
not only an originalist approach to judging—any other approach
would involve application of something other than the duly
enacted Constitution—but also the rejection of stare decisis.91
Because stare decisis applies only where a court concludes that a
past decision was wrong,92 the Court would not need the doctrine
to “follow” those past decisions that are correct. And because
adherence to past decisions that are incorrect, as assessed by the
originalist yardstick, would require allegiance to something
other than the duly enacted Constitution, stare decisis is
illegitimate as applied to them (and thus in any context in
which it would be doing any work).
The alternative conception of constitutional legitimacy
places its bases, not in 1787’s social contract, but rather in
acceptance. There are various strands and permutations of the
underlying ideas,93 with two being significant for present
purposes. One is the assertion that the Constitution does not,
and indeed cannot, legitimate itself. Its legitimacy instead
requires resort to a pre-constitutional rule. To distill the
essence of an example Frederick Schauer uses to make the
point, any group of us might draft and ratify according to its
89 See Dorf, supra note 26, at 1766-67. As Dorf characterizes originalism,
“unelected judges may displace legislative decisions in the name of the Constitution, but
only because the Constitution is a social contract to which consent was validly given
through ratification.” Id. at 1766. There are, he acknowledges, other bases on which
originalism might be grounded. Justice Scalia, for example, justifies his admittedly “faint-
hearted” originalism on consequentialist grounds, arguing that while it is not perfect, it is
the best available alternative for achieving judicial restraint. See Antonin Scalia,
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989). But, as Dorf points out, once
one rejects a social contract theory, all that remains as a basis for legitimacy is some sort
of acceptance. While it is quite possible to make normative arguments in favor of a non-
contract-theory based originalism, and to couple them with arguments against adherence
to precedent, it is implausible (given the history and general acceptance of precedent-
based arguments in constitutional law) to back a descriptive claim that the nature of the
acceptance by which our current polity legitimates the Constitution is inconsistent with
reliance on precedent.
90 On this view, “unelected judges may displace legislative decisions in the
name of the Constitution, but only because the Constitution is a social contract to
which consent was validly given through ratification.” Dorf, supra note 26, at 1766.
91 One could, of course, hold a contractual view of the Constitution in which
the terms of the contract legitimate non-originalist interpretive methods, including the
use of stare decisis.
92 See supra Part I.B.1.
93 See Dorf, supra note 26, at 1772.
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own terms a document entitled “The Constitution of the United
States” that purports to give to us all the powers presently
possessed by the federal government.94 Such a document would
not, of course, vest us with the powers it asserts and the reason
has nothing to do with the terms of the document and
everything to do with the fact that no one would accept our
constitution as the Constitution. Another way to illustrate the
point is to note that the Constitution itself was adopted in a
manner contrary to the Articles of Confederation and was, in
that sense, illegal.95 That we regard the Constitution, and not
the Articles, as the authoritative charter of our government is
ultimately a product of social consensus rather than the
satisfaction of formal, legal criteria.96
The second idea stems from “dead hand” critiques of the
social contract theory that question whether there is any reason
for our current polity to regard itself as bound by consent given
over two centuries ago by less than half the population.97 As
Noah Webster put the point in arguing against the Bill of
Rights, “The very attempt to make perpetual constitutions, is the
assumption of the right to control the opinions of future
generations; and to legislate for those over whom we have as
little authority as we have over a nation in Asia.”98 And as David
Strauss memorably updates the point, U.S. citizens would not
for a moment regard themselves as bound by decisions made by
the current government of Canada, yet we have considerably
more in common with the people who make up that government
than we do with our founding generation.99
Thus our Constitution is legitimated, on either
approach, not because of the consent of the Framers’
94 Schauer, supra note 51, at 50-55.
95 See Kay, supra note 51, at 57, 62-64.
96 Schauer, supra note 51, at 50-55.
97
The first question any advocate of constitutionalism must answer is why
Americans of today should be bound by the decisions of people some 212
years ago. The Framers and Ratifiers did not represent us, and in many cases
did not even represent people like us, if we happen to be Catholic or Jewish,
or female or black or poor. What is most devastating to any claim of authority
on their part is that the Framers and Ratifiers are long dead. Why should
their decisions prevent the people of today from governing ourselves as we
see fit? This is commonly known as the “dead hand problem.”
Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1127, 1127 (1998) (quoting JOHNHART ELY, DEMOCRACY ANDDISTRUST 11 (1980)).
98 Giles Hickory [Noah Webster], On Bills of Rights, 1 AM. MAG., Dec. 1787,
at 13-14.
99 David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI.
L. REV. 877, 880 (1996).
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generation, but through our contemporary acceptance of, or at
least acquiescence in, its binding nature.100 In contrast to a
contractually based theory of legitimacy, however, acceptance-
based theories do not lead so directly to specific interpretive
methods. The nature of our legitimating acceptance might be
such as to privilege or perhaps even require originalist
interpretation, but it certainly extends farther than that to
embrace, at least potentially, nearly any methodology.
Moreover, as Dorf observes, legitimacy, much like stare decisis,
is a scalar rather than a binary concept:
Many different approaches to interpretation are legitimate in the
sense that decisions rendered according to these approaches ought to
and will be accepted as binding law . . . . [L]egitimacy should be
viewed as a matter of degree: That one interpretive technique is, in
some cases, more legitimate than another does not render the less
legitimate approach illegitimate.101
We will return to these ideas below. For now, the significant
point is that among the interpretive techniques that have
garnered widespread acceptance is reliance on stare decisis.102
Significantly, acceptance as the ground for constitutional
legitimacy extends to substantive doctrine as well as to
methodology. As the block quote from Casey suggests, “changed
circumstances may impose new obligations.”103 Though theorists
debate the mechanisms,104 most commentators accept the idea
that the meaning of the Constitution changes as our polity
100 See supra note 51.
101 Dorf, supra note 26, at 1772.
102 Richard Fallon argues that the legitimacy of stare decisis in the
constitutional context is rooted, as is the case with constitutional legitimacy more
generally, in acceptance rather than the written Constitution. “[T]he practice of judges in
embracing precedent as deserving of enforcement and sometimes extension, when
conjoined with the public’s acceptance of precedent-based decisions as legally
authoritative, suffices to confer legal legitimacy on adherence to and reasonable extension
of non-originalist precedent.” Legitimacy, supra note 51, at 1824; see also Stare Decisis,
supra note 51, at 572 (arguing that stare decisis “is a doctrine of constitutional
magnitude, but one that is rooted as much in unwritten norms of constitutional practice
as in the written Constitution itself” and one that involves “unwritten norms that are
validated by a mixture of acceptance and reasonable justice”).
103 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 863-64 (1992).
104 Perhaps the most prominent example is Bruce Ackerman’s notion of
“constitutional moments.” See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
TRANSFORMATIONS (1998). Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson offer up the less dramatic
notion of “partisan entrenchment:” “When enough members of a particular party are
appointed to the federal judiciary, they start to change the understandings of the
Constitution that appear in positive law. If more people are appointed in a relatively
short period of time, the changes will occur more quickly. Constitutional revolutions are
the cumulative result of successful partisan entrenchment when the entrenching party
has a relatively coherent political ideology or can pick up sufficient ideological allies from
the appointees of other parties.” Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the
Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1067-68 (2001).
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changes. The Court’s decision striking down the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA) in United States v. Windsor105 provides
the most high profile recent example. The notion that
legislation such as DOMA is unconstitutional would have been
unthinkable a decade ago, and the Court’s conclusion seems
necessarily to be the product of general attitudinal shifts
regarding same-sex marriage.106 Larry Solum has recently
developed the notion of the “constitutional gestalt” to describe
this phenomenon.107 Just as the common law features zones of
acceptance, rejection, and flux, constitutional law features a
canon and an anticanon, as well as a transitional zone in which
some norms may linger while others pass through on their way
to acceptance or rejection.108 “The norms that govern the
complex practice of constitutional argument are dynamic,
changing over time in response to both politics and
developments within the practice itself.”109
Stare decisis is critical to this evolution. Because
precedent’s authority in constitutional cases is scalar, just as it
is in the common law, and weaker than in the common law,110 it
serves as a moderating force, a device for provisionally fixing in
place the law that applies in certain contexts.111 It is a doctrine
that comes into play only in the gray area between propositions
105 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
106 Even Justice (then Judge) Scalia has recognized the connection between
popular acceptance and the Court’s ability to reach certain constitutional conclusions.
Antonin Scalia, Economic Affairs as Human Affairs, in ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE
JUDICIARY 31-37 (James A. Dorn & Henry G. Manne eds., 1987) (“Unless I have been
on the bench so long that I no longer have any feel for popular sentiment, I do not
detect the sort of national commitment to most of the economic liberties generally
discussed that would enable even an activist court to constitutionalize them.”).
107 See Lawrence B. Solum, How NFIB v. Sebelius Affects the Constitutional
Gestalt, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2013).
108 Id. at 41.
[T]he constitutional gestalt does not settle all constitutional questions. Given
the dominant constitutional gestalt, some territory may be mapped as
disputed—subject to contestation in constitutional litigation and in
interactions between the various branches of government. Given the same
dominant constitutional gestalt, other territory may be mapped as beyond
dispute—outside the bounds of constitutional contestation because of settled
constitutional norms.
Id.
109 Id. at 38.
110 See supra note 59.
111 Cf. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional
Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 132 (1991) (“Precedents perform
various roles in the Court’s decisionmaking and for society, virtually all of which are ignored
by a unitary theory. Perhaps most important, the Court’s review of its decisions comprises a
dialogue among the Justices on the need to decide cases narrowly and move incrementally
to avoid constitutional error and on whether to perpetuate certain values the Court
previously has approved for guiding the operation of government.”).
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that are clearly established as law and those that are clearly not
law. A decision may reach a controversial holding—regarding,
say, the nature of the right protected by an amendment, the
scope of executive power, or a question of federalism. At first,
stare decisis will hold the decision in place, whether in the
context of a subsequent case raising the same issue or, more
likely, via the reluctance of parties to seek review of the issue or
the refusal of the Court to grant certiorari.112 After some amount
of time, the case’s holding will likely either become so widely
accepted that it is clearly part of the legal fabric, in which case
it is no longer reliant on stare decisis for its perpetuation,113 or
it will be revealed as mistaken, in which case it will be
overturned. The boundaries of all of these categories shift over
time. The once unthinkable—women as the equals of men,
constitutional protection of same-sex marriage, and so on—are
now accepted, and the same will hold with respect to many of
our generally accepted views. But these sorts of
transformations do not occur instantaneously, and there is
always the possibility that the Court will guess wrong.114 Stare
decisis acts as an agent of acceptance, ushering propositions
into and out of the Constitution. It also acts as an agent of
stability, though not in the way it is typically understood to do
so. Most accounts of the contribution of stare decisis to stability
envision it as preserving the core of the law.115 Unless one is a
strict originalist, however, one at least implicitly accepts the
idea that core legal propositions—constitutional or otherwise—
derive their stability from generalized acceptance of them as
correct. Stare decisis serves as a buffer against radical change,
to be sure, but only with respect to those propositions outside
the range of general acceptance, which is where radical change
is most likely to occur.
112 Monaghan, supra note 37, at 744-46 (discussing the agenda-limiting
function of stare decisis).
113 This is contrary to the role some commentators assert for precedent.
Monaghan, for example, suggests that stare decisis leads to some issues being so well
settled that they are off the table. Id. I contend that they are off the table for reasons
apart from stare decisis. See supra Part I.B.4.
114 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS,
BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, at x (2013) (“When the Court
intervenes to defend a minority position or even to resolve an issue that divides the country
down the middle, its decisions can generate political backlash, especially when the losers are
intensely committed, politically organized, and geographically concentrated.”).
115 E.g., Monaghan, supra note 37.
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II. THE PROSPECT OFMETHODOLOGICAL STAREDECISIS
Let us put all of this together. The basic case for
methodological stare decisis in constitutional interpretation is
straightforward and it has considerable superficial appeal. In
capsule form, it is that preservation of the values furthered by
stare decisis—equal treatment, predictability, stability, and
enhanced decision making—would be furthered as much, if not
more, by adherence to a consistent methodology, as they are by
adherence to the results of past decisions.
Consider the matter first from the perspective of the
parties affected by a decision. To them, a change in
methodology could feel illegitimate—even where the result the
new methodology generates can be squared with past cases.
Take a non-legal example. Imagine siblings whose favorite food
is pizza and who ask to have the preceding night’s leftovers for
lunch. In Case 1 parent says to Child A, “you can have half of
whatever is left,” which turns out to be two slices. The
following week, in Case 2 parent says to Child B, “you can have
two slices,” where there are six slices left. Child B could
plausibly claim to be aggrieved in this situation. The decisional
methodology seems to have changed from one based on the
amount of pizza remaining to one based on some sort of
assessment of how much pizza is appropriate to have for lunch.
Indeed, the children might find this change in approach
upsetting even if it generated the same result in both
situations (i.e., if there were only four slices left in Case 2).
Under the first methodology the children had an ability to
influence outcomes—by eating less pizza for dinner—that they
lose under the second.
As this simple example suggests, knowing how a decision
will be made can be significant and its effects will extend beyond
the parties to a decision. Indeed, in at least some situations, it
would appear to be that knowledge of a court’s methodology, and
not merely knowledge of its past results, is necessary to produce
the beneficial predictability and stability associated with stare
decisis. Only if one has a basis on which to extrapolate from past
results can one predict what a future court will do and knowing
something about methodology seems necessary for effective
extrapolation. My sense of the scope of my Second Amendment
rights, for example, depends on my sense of whether those rights
will continue to be assessed via an originalist methodology. The
pizza example also highlights the indistinct nature of the
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boundary between method and substance,116 which further
underscores the seeming appropriateness of giving stare decisis
effect to both sorts of decisions.
Yet there are features of stare decisis that ought to give
us pause as we consider whether to apply it to methodology. As
we have seen, the doctrine of stare decisis operates both
incrementally and in a limited domain. It works to hold rules in
place until such time as they either become generally accepted
(to the point that no court need rely on stare decisis in support
of or justification for its decision, because all courts and
observers accept the proposition in question as true) or are
determined to have been wrong. At the same time, stare decisis
as implemented within a substantive domain necessarily has a
limited scope. There are many approaches to determining the
boundaries of that scope, but all assume that the precedential
holding of an opinion will be limited to a particular swath of
substantive law.117 A given case will be, at its broadest level, a
tort, contract, or constitutional law precedent and more
precisely a precedent within some doctrinal subset of those
areas. To the extent that it has applicability beyond that, it will
be only in the sense of being persuasive authority, for the
substantive law framework that the precedent implements will
be part of what defines the parameters of its applicability.
It is also useful to recall the connection between stare
decisis and social consensus in the common law.118 There we saw
that the scope and validity of stare decisis is tied to the social
consensus underlying the doctrinal proposition embodied in a
given precedent. Judicial methodology is likewise developed in
common-law fashion. Put differently, since there is no valid and
authoritative external source (i.e., legislation or the
Constitution) imposing interpretive methods on courts, at least
with respect to the questions we are considering, the
development of these methods is left to the courts themselves.119
116 See supra note 25.
117 For example, Melvin Eisenberg provides three approaches to the task of
determining what a past precedent stands for: (1) “Under a minimalist approach, the
rule of a precedent consists of that part of the rule announced by the precedent court’s
opinion that was necessary for the decision.” EISENBERG, supra note 56, at 52; (2)
“Under a result-centered approach, the rule of a precedent consists of the proposition
that on the facts of the precedent (or some of them) the result of the precedent should
be reached.” Id.; (3) “Under [the announcement] approach, the rule of a precedent
consists of the rule it states, provided that rule is relevant to the issues raised by the
dispute before the court.” Id. at 55.
118 See supra Part I.B.4.
119 Cf. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation,
115 HARV. L. REV. 2085 (2002) (arguing that Congress has and should exercise the
power to impose rules of statutory construction on the federal courts).
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Resort to stare decisis is anchored in the same social consensus
underlying the doctrinal propositions themselves. The same
holds for other methodological tools. Stare decisis is a product of,
rather than external to, the consensus that legitimates the rest
of law in its substantive and procedural dimensions. To say that
stare decisis confers legitimacy on or privileges a particular
interpretive method, then, is to say not only that consensus
supports the use of stare decisis to force methodological choices
as a general matter, but also that it countenances the privileging
of this specific method.
To put the point differently, what counts as proper legal
argument is what we accept as legal argument, and what we
accept is, by virtue of that acceptance, what is proper. Fred
Schauer has argued that “the recognition and non-recognition
of law and legal sources is better understood as a practice in
the Wittgensteinian sense: a practice in which lawyers, judges,
commentators, and other legal actors gradually and in diffuse
fashion determine what will count as a legitimate source—and
thus what will count as law.”120 In Philip Bobbitt’s phrasing,
“arguments are conventions . . . they could be different,
but . . . then we would be different.”121 Legal reasoning thus
takes place within a framework established by the acceptance of
certain conventions. Judges can reason from those conventions,
but they cannot reliably reason to them.122
The choice to follow a consistent methodology, then, is
necessarily the product of the same sort of analysis as that
which produced the general commitment to stare decisis. It is
an analysis that is prior to, rather than a product of, precedential
reasoning. What is required instead is firmly established social
consensus underlying the methodological choice of the sort that
makes the resort to stare decisis unnecessary. This sort of
consensus underlies some methodological choices—that courts
should not resort to coin flips to decide cases, that they should
start with the text when presented with a question of statutory
120 Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931, 1957 (2008).
121 PHILIPBOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONALFATE: THEORYOFTHECONSTITUTION6 (1984).
122 Schauer argues
that constitutions rest on logically antecedent presuppositions that give them
their constitutional status. As a result, constitutions can and do change not
only when they are amended according to their own provisions or their own
history, however broadly those provisions or that history may be understood,
but whenever there is a change in these underlying presuppositions—
political and social, but decidedly not constitutional or legal.
Frederick Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions of a Constitution, in RESPONDING TO
IMPERFECTION 145, 147-48 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
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interpretation, etc.—but is not widely enough shared to
support all of them. It also explains why we are able to see
methodological consistency, and perhaps even something that
can properly be called methodological stare decisis, in certain
narrower domains.
The following two subsections explore these ideas in
greater detail. First by exploring the merits of the recently
advanced case for stare decisis as to statutory interpretation
methodology and second by taking up the prospect of
methodological stare decisis in constitutional interpretation.
A. Methodological Stare Decisis and Statutory
Interpretation
Constitutional law is not the only area in which there is a
clear lack of methodological consensus. Statutory interpretation,
at least in the federal courts, is another. Here, too, the Supreme
Court’s opinions often include broad methodological statements,
made in a manner that suggests their uncontroversial nature
and consistent application. Yet such statements are often in
conflict with those appearing in both preceding and subsequent
opinions.123 As is true in the context of constitutional
methodologies, these changes in approach occur without any
discussion of whether the Court ought to consider itself bound
by past pronouncements, and with no Justices suggesting that
they might have voted differently but for an allegiance to the
settled methodologies of past cases.124 As Abbe Gluck
summarizes, “the U.S. Supreme Court is simply not in the
practice of picking a single interpretive methodology for
statutes. Indeed, the Court does not give stare decisis effect to
any statements of statutory interpretation methodology.”125
There is, of course, no shortage of scholarship advocating
in favor of particular methods of statutory interpretation, and
123 See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Polymorphic Principle and the Judicial Role in
Statutory Interpretation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 339, 385-86 (2005).
124 See Foster, supra note 18, at 1875-76.
125 Laboratories, supra note 13, at 1765 (citing Rosenkranz and Siegel). As
Gluck’s own analysis demonstrates, she overstates the point, but only slightly. As she
acknowledges, the Chevron doctrine is an exception. Id. at 1817 (“The Court does apply
methodological stare decisis in this unique context: Chevron is precedential for much
more than its mere substantive (environmental law) holding; far more significant has
been the methodology it sets forth for all future potential deference cases.”). The
Court’s opinions also suggest that it consistently adheres to certain textual canons of
interpretation. Jordan Wilder Connors, Note, Treating Like Subdecisions Alike: The
Scope of Stare Decisis as Applied to Judicial Methodology, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 681, 701
(2008). These islands of consistency appear to be ad hoc, at least in that the Court has
not openly discussed why it is that these areas are settled and not others.
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those arguments, at least implicitly, also call for the uniform
adoption of the method they advocate.126 There are also judges
who consistently follow certain interpretive approaches.127 In
these senses, the landscape of statutory interpretation
resembles that of constitutional interpretation. It also does so in
the sense that none of the participants in the debates advocate
that courts should give stare decisis effect to the methodological
components of decisions.
Or so it was. A recent strain of scholarship has made
the case for the adoption of a single method of statutory
interpretation, and done so in a way that expressly emphasizes
the values of uniformity and that is (largely) agnostic with
respect to the particular method chosen. One such approach
would involve the legislative imposition of an interpretive
methodology.128 Another approach urges the Court to draw on
stare decisis to impose a uniform methodology on itself and the
federal judiciary.129
The basics of the argument are as follows. It begins with
the fact that the Court gives greater stare decisis effect to the
substantive components of its statutory interpretation
decisions than it does to its constitutional decisions.130 This is
justified based on the relative ease with which statutory
decisions can be corrected. It is far easier for Congress to
amend a statute in reaction to the Court’s interpretation than
it is for the Constitution to be amended.131 The argument for
methodological stare decisis, as applied to methods of statutory
interpretation, begins in a similar place. Its proponents contend
that the establishment of a consistent interpretive methodology
would enable legislatures to better anticipate how the courts will
read proposed statutes and thereby avoid the use of language
that would be misinterpreted by the courts.132 A legislature that
understands that the courts will never consult legislative history
or will always apply a certain canon of construction, the
reasoning goes, can be more careful in its choice of language and
thereby better effectuate its intent. Much like substantive stare
126 See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION (2d ed. 2006).
127 The most prominent judicial advocate of adherence to a single interpretive
approach is undoubtedly Justice Scalia. See Siegel, supra note 123, at 370 (“Justice
Scalia is the Supreme Court’s most persistent and doctrinaire thinker with regard to
matters of statutory interpretation.”).
128 E.g., Rosenkranz, supra note 119, at 2086.
129 Foster, supra note 18, at 1884.
130 E.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 n.1 (1989).
131 Id.
132 E.g., Connors, supra note 125, at 683-84; Foster, supra note 18, at 1887.
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decisis, this would not be cost-free.133 Litigants under such a
regime would be better able to pitch their arguments to courts,
and overall the adoption of a consistent approach would further
rule-of-law values by enhancing predictability and thereby
making life easier and less expensive for the other actors in the
system, be they legislatures, lower courts, or litigants.134
This turns out to be more than academic theorizing. As
Abbe Gluck has demonstrated, the methodological disagreement
that characterizes the federal courts does not necessarily hold in
state courts. Not only do state legislatures routinely enact rules
of interpretation,135 many state courts have imposed
interpretive methodologies on themselves. Gluck studied the
statutory interpretation case law in five states and found
conclusive evidence of the adoption of a consistent methodology
in four of them.136 The courts in two of these states—Michigan
and Wisconsin—have adopted and adhered to a methodology
despite bitter ideological divisions.137 The courts in these states
have adopted versions of what she calls “modified
textualism.”138 The approach “ranks interpretive tools in a clear
order: textual analysis, then legislative history, then default
judicial presumptions.”139 And while she concedes that it is a
methodology that may be agreeable because it is malleable—
strict textualists can be persuaded to march under its banner
because it gives primacy to the text, while purposivists see it as
133 For example, Foster concedes that “some interpretive principles have
distributive consequences” in that they will systematically tend to favor certain types of
parties, and that the application of these principles “require[s] normative justification
independent of the rule-of-law and coordination justifications.” Foster, supra note 18, at
1890. She rejects the suggestion that this is fatal to the project of methodological stare
decisis, on the grounds that judges will have to make the required normative judgments
anyway, with the only difference being that in a world of methodological stare decisis
these judgments will be binding. This is not problematic, she continues, because the
precedent will be set by judges with different preferences. “There are a multitude of
statutory interpretation doctrines and thus, over the long run, the normative desirability
of statutory interpretation doctrine from the perspective of any given individual is likely
to be similar under a regime of stare decisis and a regime of no stare decisis.” Id. at 1891-
92. This analysis, it seems to me, overlooks some key points. One is that different
interpretive doctrines will have different scopes of both application and normative effect,
such that there is a greater potential for uneven distribution than the analysis suggests.
Moreover, implementing a regime of methodological stare decisis privileges those who are
able to make the initial decisions, and there is no reason to believe that that group will be
representative of all relevant perspectives. Yet that initial group is likely to face the
questions that arise most frequently and have the broadest applicability.
134 Laboratories, supra note 13, at 1767.
135 Id. at 1754.
136 Her study focused only on these five states, rather than being a
comprehensive survey. As a result, it is likely that these five are not the only ones to
have achieved some level of methodological consistency.
137 Id. at 1801-02, 1823.
138 Id. at 1829-45.
139 Id. at 1758.
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offering sufficient room to escape the limitations of text-only
approach140—she nonetheless finds evidence that it provides
actual constraint. “Judges concur to say they would decide
cases differently were they not constrained by the interpretive
framework; lower court cases are being vacated and remanded
solely on the ground that they were decided using the wrong
methodology.”141 Her analysis of the Oregon Supreme Court’s
application of its methodological framework revealed that the
court managed to create:
[A] small and predictable universe of interpretive tools, producing very
few intracourt fights about whether cases are to be decided at step
one, two, or three, and giving rise to apparently not a single dissenting
or concurring opinion claiming the court was manipulating its
methodological framework to reach preferred results.142
Of course, the fact that adoption of a uniform approach
seems to have worked at the state level does not mean that its
logic necessarily transfers to the federal courts. The state
courts Gluck found to have reached methodological consensus
have done so while drawing on the literature relating to
interpretation at the federal level but without having examined
or acknowledged the potential institutional and other
differences that might hold in the two contexts.143 She identifies
a number of differences between the states and the federal
government that might influence their respective willingness
or practical ability to adopt a uniform interpretive framework.
These include the greater history of and familiarity with
common-law adjudication in the states, the fact that many state
court judges must be elected, the greater administrative
responsibilities of many state supreme courts, and the likely
ability of a state legislature to monitor judicial outputs.144 There
are atmospheric differences as well. The Supreme Court is
subject to scrutiny in a way that state’s highest courts are not,
and the Justices are individually of much higher profile than
140 Gluck notes that the case for modified textualism is not so much that it
provides the best approach, but rather that it is valuable as a “second best”:
This is important because it shifts the inquiry away from the idea that there
is a single “ideal” way to ascertain the meaning of a statute—a question more
likely to divide judges and scholars—to, instead, the question of whether
there is a sufficiently satisfying theoretical compromise that will also
enhance coordination and stability in a complex and (for lower courts)
overworked legal system.
Id. at 1856.
141 Id. at 1823 (internal citation omitted).
142 Id. at 1785.
143 Id. at 1789 (Texas); 1793 (Connecticut); 1804 (Michigan).
144 Id. at 1813, 1815-16.
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their counterparts in the states. These factors, combined with
the fact that the cases that make it before the Supreme Court
tend to be the most difficult, may exaggerate the differences
between the various interpretive camps and make agreement
less likely.145
We might also question the extent to which the benefits
are as advertised. A skeptic might question the underlying
notion that legislatures are sufficiently sensitive to
methodology,146 or that an interpretive methodology—even one
that judges purport to feel constrained by—can be determinate
enough to enable legislatures to predict its application with
enough certainty for it to make a difference. The statutory
interpretation issues that end up before the courts, after all, are
likely to relate to provisions that the legislature did not foresee
applying to the situation at hand, or else they would have made
the statute clear on the point. There may be something to the
idea that a legislature that knows the interpretive rules ahead
of time will be able to draft a statute in such a way as to skew
the resolution of unanticipated cases in one direction or
another. But if the core problem is that courts are often asked
to apply statutes to situations that the legislature did not
anticipate, then it is not clear that enabling the legislature to
know what interpretive rules will apply in these cases
purchases much in terms of interpretive clarity. A fallback
argument might be that clear rules would at least enable the
drafting of language with confidence concerning what courts
will not do with it; in other words, that it better positions
legislatures to head off certain interpretations. The questions
are ultimately empirical, of course, and so my point is not to be
conclusive but instead to question the asserted magnitude of
the benefits.147
Reflection on this literature concerning statutory
interpretation uncovers another point. Though the authors
often use the phrase “stare decisis” to describe what they are
advocating, the basic cluster of reasons supporting the
methodological uniformity they advocate differs from the bases
of stare decisis as traditionally understood. What we see
instead, in both the normative arguments for the adoption of a
145 Id. at 1821.
146 E.g., Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in
the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 806 (1983).
147 Abbe Gluck and Lisa Bressman have surveyed congressional staffers
concerning their knowledge and use of the canons of statutory interpretation, finding that
only some are consistently known and relied on. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz
Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional
Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 902 (2013).
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uniform methodology and Gluck’s descriptive account, is the
case for consensus.148 The arguments certainly overlap with
those rooted in stare decisis, and many of the underlying goals
are the same. But these are ultimately more general rule-
consequentialist arguments for methodological uniformity
rather than stare decisis arguments. The primary difference is
in terms of the doctrine’s bite. As we have already seen,
precedent as traditionally conceived exerts scalar rather than
absolute force149 and is thereby a device for incrementalism, one
that enables courts to place provisional markers along the
path, and that allows them to pick up those markers and move
in a different direction if the path turns out to be unworkable.
Yet what Foster, at least, advocates, is that “courts should give
doctrines of statutory interpretation what I call ‘extra-strong’
stare decisis effect.”150 It is, in effect, an implied acknowledgment
that the coordination and rule-of-law benefits, which she
suggests would follow from methodological stare decisis, will
come into being only if the regime is ironclad.151 Put differently,
148 Foster acknowledges, but does not really grapple with, the categories of
assimilation/rules of relevance issues. She raises the example of a holding that it is
impermissible to consult a floor statement in connection with the interpretation of a
particular statute, which in turn prompts the question of how broadly such a holding
would apply. Her answer: “Like questions of substantive law, such questions would have
to be decided on a case-by-case basis and would turn on considerations such as the degree
to which the rationale for the rule of statutory interpretation at issue is broadly
applicable.” Foster, supra note 18, at 1869. Consideration of the whole of her analysis,
however, suggests that the logic of methodological stare decisis in the statutory context
pushes toward a broad precedential scope. Recall that a significant part of the case for
methodological stare decisis in this context is that it would provide a fixed background for
the legislature to act against. The use of narrow categories of precedent would run
contrary to that justification, both in that it would make it more difficult for the
legislature to determine what the applicable interpretive approach is, and in that it would
make it easier for a court to distinguish away a past methodological precedent. Moreover,
because the justifications for statutory methodological stare decisis are global in nature,
achievement of the concomitant ends likewise requires their application at a broad level.
This is not to suggest that differentiation amongst types of statutes would be
categorically inappropriate. There is, for example, a strong case to be made for the
application of a different approach to criminal statutes. But, in light of the justifications
for statutory methodological stare decisis, it seems difficult to suggest that the rule of
relevance governing a prohibition on consulting floor statements would have to be
“statutes,” or something nearly as broad. So conceived, the case for methodological stare
decisis in the statutory context may be less compelling than its advocates suggest.
149 See supra Part I.B.3.
150 Foster, supra note 18, at 1868.
151 She identifies two primary benefits associated with methodological stare
decisis. First, that it would further the rule of law by enhancing the predictability of law
and reducing judicial discretion. Id. at 1887. Second, that it would enhance interbranch
coordination by making it easier for Congress to know how its statutes will be handled by
the judiciary. Id. at 1887-89. These benefits, she contends, are unique to the statutory
interpretation context, whereas the costs associated with stare decisis here are equivalent
to those present in substantive stare decisis. Id. at 1892. But this may be to undersell the
costs, even if it is not to oversell the benefits. With respect to the benefits, her argument
assumes a certain version of legislative supremacy and a certain conception of the judicial
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it is a suggestion that stare decisis take on a binary, rather than
scalar, character in this context.
Whatever the ultimate merits of the case for
methodological stare decisis as applied to statutory
interpretation,152 the idea has gained considerable traction in
both academia and the courts. What is more, many of its
academic proponents have suggested that the idea would
transfer to constitutional interpretation.153 The next subpart
takes up that possibility.
B. Methodological Stare Decisis and Constitutional
Interpretation
Let us, then, finally turn our attention specifically to the
application of stare decisis to constitutional interpretive
methodology. Why does the Supreme Court not give
precedential effect to the methodological choices in its past
decisions? Considered in the language of the Casey joint
opinion, it is easy to appreciate the potential allure of
methodological stare decisis as applied to constitutional
interpretation. Much of the joint opinion’s justification for
continued adherence to the basic holding of Roe v. Wade turns
on the relationship between principled decision making and the
Court’s legitimacy.
The Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow people
to accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims for them, as
grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social and
political pressures having, as such, no bearing on the principled
choices that the Court is obliged to make.154
role that, as she acknowledges, limits judicial discretion. She is careful to note that she
does not equate methodological stare decisis as applied to statutory interpretation with
rigid formalism, id. at 1869, yet it seems inescapable that the benefits she associates with
methodological stare decisis are correlated with the level of formality present in the
regime. One that allowed for flexibility and discretion, after all, would seemingly generate
less predictability for both the legislature and private actors. The remainder of her
assessment of costs and benefits is rooted in the stare decisis literature, id. at 1892-97,
but what she overlooks is the scalar nature of stare decisis as doctrine. This is not to
suggest that her analysis or the factors that she considers are inapposite, but rather that
the arguments that underlie stare decisis will also serve as valid arguments for
methodological consensus (or settlement).
152 For a powerful critique, see Evan J. Criddle & Glen Staszewski, Against
Methodological Stare Decisis, 102 GEO. L.J. 1573 (2014).
153 E.g., Foster, supra note 18, at 1871-72 (suggesting that the reasoning behind
the argument for methodological stare decisis in the statutory context might also apply to
constitutional interpretation, but noting clear differences between the two contexts).
154 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865-66 (1992).
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Frequent overruling, it continues, “would overtax the country’s
belief in the Court’s good faith.”155
Those claims seem to apply with equal, if not greater,
force to methodological choices. A Court free from
methodological disputes and free from casual gliding back and
forth between different methodological approaches without
remark is arguably a Court better able to convince the people
to accept its decisions on the terms it offers, and one that is
truly grounding them in principle rather than political
expediency. Indeed, the notion of treating like cases alike
seems to fit more comfortably with methodology than with
substance, since methodology would seem to present a more
generalizable criterion for assessing likeness. It is likewise
easy to imagine methodological consistency as congenial to
predictability in that it would allow one to anticipate the sorts
of arguments and authorities that would factor into the
decisional process. There are perhaps aspects in which decision
making would be strengthened as well, at least in the sense
that a court would not have to reconsider interpretive
methodology in each new case, and would instead be free to
devote its resources to the increasing refinement of its single,
favored approach.
As suggested above, there are multiple respects in
which the Court consistently adheres to what can plausibly be
described as methodologies, some of which are more akin to the
sort of interpretive methodologies with which this article is
primarily concerned. Consider, for example, the familiar tiered-
scrutiny framework that applies to claims under the Equal
Protection Clause.156 That framework sets up a process by
which courts faced with equal protection claims will analyze
them—a specific (which is not to say precise) methodology by
which a court is to apply a given level of scrutiny depending on
the nature of the alleged violation. And it is but a single
example of a more general phenomenon. Indeed, much of the
work of constitutional doctrine can be conceived of in terms of
methodology, insofar as it entails the development, refinement,
and application of tests designed to assess whether the
Constitution has been complied with. There is also a great deal
of consensus with respect to what does not count as an
appropriate method. The excluded processes include not only
somewhat plausible mechanisms (decisions announced via
seriatim or advisory opinions) but also a wide array of
155 Id. at 866.
156 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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implausible approaches (decisions reached by coin flip or by
reference to the writings of L. Ron Hubbard).
An initial task, then, is to consider whether it is possible
to draw a meaningful line between the situations in which there
appears to be methodological consistency and those as to which
there is not. A promising distinction turns on the difference
between, on the one hand, determining constitutional meaning,
and on the other, implementing the Constitution once its
meaning is settled. Mitch Berman has captured the idea in his
differentiation of operative propositions and decision rules.
Operative propositions are “constitutional doctrines that
represent the judiciary’s understanding of the proper meaning
of a constitutional power, right, duty, or other sort of
provision.”157 Decision rules, in contrast, are “doctrines that
direct courts how to decide whether a constitutional operative
proposition is satisfied.”158
An example will help. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that
“[n]o state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.” The courts are called upon, in the
process of adjudication, to determine what this provision means. In
performing that task, the courts may rely on any number of
interpretive considerations, including such “modalities” as text,
history, precedent, structure, moral judgment, and the like. Suppose
the federal judiciary interprets the provision to mean that
government may not classify individuals in ways not reasonably
designed to promote a legitimate state interest. Such, then, is the
constitutional operative provision. But that is not the whole of judge-
made constitutional doctrine. A court cannot implement this
operative proposition without some sort of procedure (perhaps
implicit) for determining whether to adjudge the operative
proposition satisfied when, as will always be the case, the court lacks
unmediated access to the true fact of the matter. It needs, that is to
say, a constitutional decision rule.159
As Berman’s discussion reveals, decision rules do not
exist independently of operative propositions, but rather are
premised on a particular understanding of an operative
proposition. They are subsequent to and arise out of the effort
to understand the meaning of a constitutional provision and
are designed to facilitate the implementation of that provision
given some prior understanding of what the provision means.
For example, tiered scrutiny exists as a product of a certain
understanding of the Equal Protection Clause, and a different
understanding of that clause—a different formulation of the
157 Berman, supra note 19, at 9.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 9-10 (internal citations omitted).
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operative proposition—would most likely lead to a different
framework of decision rules. Thus decision rules are designed
in large part to account for the various constraints, primarily
limited time and a lack of complete information, that prevent
judges from confidently being able to accurately apply
operative propositions on an ad hoc basis. Tiered scrutiny
provides a roughly calibrated mechanism for ensuring the
protection of certain types of interests that we might fear
would be underprotected under an alternate scheme. We
subject racial classifications to strict scrutiny, for example,
because of the nature of the harm at stake and the difficulty of
determining the true motives behind such a classification.
The distinction between decision rules and operative
propositions may be, as Berman acknowledges, easier to grasp
in theory than to apply with precision.160 The line is, at best,
blurred. But the distinction is useful and illuminates our
consideration of the possibility of methodological stare decisis.
The bulk of constitutional theory, and of what we might call
interpretive methodology, concerns the processes of divining
constitutional meaning—that is, of formulating operative
propositions. This involves familiar theoretical debates that
turn on the resolution of big questions such as the nature of
constitutional legitimacy, the proper role of judicial review in a
democracy, and the nature and authority of proper sources for
consultation in such an inquiry. The formulation of decision
rules involves a qualitatively different debate and one that is
largely instrumentalist in nature. Berman identifies “six
analytically distinct factors or families of factors that might
appeal to a judge considering whether, and how, to form a
constitutional decision rule—considerations [that he calls]
adjudicatory, deterrent, protective, fiscal, institutional, and
substantive.”161 Especially when contrasted with a textualist or
originalist approach to identifying the content of operative
propositions, these stand as a distinct set of considerations.
Much, if not all, of the methodological agreement in the
Court occurs in the context of decision rules. Chevron
deference,162 tiered scrutiny,163 and Pike balancing,164 to take just
160 “[W]hether a given piece of doctrine is an operative proposition depends on
one’s account of constitutional meaning, which in part depends upon one’s theory of
constitutional interpretation. Because there exist different plausible conceptions of
constitutional meaning.” Id. at 80.
161 Id. at 93.
162 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
163 For an overview, see Calvin R. Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for
Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 945 (2004).
164 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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a few examples, are mechanisms by which the Court
consistently implements a relatively fixed understanding of the
meaning of an operative proposition. The methodological
disagreement that characterizes constitutional law relates to
decision making at a higher level and concerns questions ranging
from how to interpret specific provisions of the Constitution to
whether the enterprise of judicial review is legitimate. This
disagreement exists not only in academic theory, but also in the
practices of the Supreme Court, and the Justices have shown no
interest in attempting to bring it to a halt.
As the following discussion reveals, this is no coincidence.
Stare decisis is ill-suited for methodology as applied to operative
propositions, but well-suited to decision rules.
1. Stare Decisis and Operative Propositions
It is easy to construct an argument in favor of giving
stare decisis effect to the methods by which the court
establishes operative propositions. Boiled down, it is Judge
Bork’s argument: the consistent application of a methodology is
just another name for the rule of law.165
On reflection, however, that argument’s plausibility is
only superficial. Here it is important to recall that the choice of
a methodology for interpreting the Constitution cannot be
made based entirely on the document but must instead be at
least partly a product of extra-textual grounds.166 The question,
as Richard Fallon phrases it, becomes one of “fit,” which in turn
applies a second question, namely “fit to what?”167 The choice of
a method of interpreting the document is further tied to the
source of the Constitution’s legitimacy. If we accept some
varieties of the social-contract theory of the Constitution, then
we are likely to be led to choose some variety of originalism as
the interpretive approach that best fits.168 If, in contrast,
constitutional legitimacy stems from acceptance, then the
range of criteria to be taken into account is much broader and
will ultimately be tied to that same legitimating acceptance.
The factors that might bear on our choice of methodology then
include not only some privileging of the text and original
understanding, but also things like the proper place of the
judiciary within our governmental structure, the relative
165 See BORK, supra note 8.
166 See supra Part I.C.
167 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87
CALIF. L. REV. 535, 549-50 (1999).
168 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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competence of the judiciary to determine constitutional
meaning, and the sorts of external constraints that the
judiciary might face in attempting to impose its view of the
Constitution on those who would be subject to its rulings. This is
surely an incomplete list. It is sufficient, however, to establish at
least one important point, which is that the universe of factors
involved in methodological choice (at the broad level) is much
greater than that involved in the application of stare decisis
doctrine. It is not that the factors that drive the application of
stare decisis are not relevant to methodological choice, it is that
they are only a portion of a larger range of considerations
underlying the decision. Indeed, that larger range of
considerations includes many if not all those that drive our
decision to accept the validity of stare decisis.
Consider the consequences of adherence to a single
methodology. That approach would certainly bring about like
treatment of like cases, but only insofar as we accept that
methodology’s conception of what makes one case like another
as the appropriate metric. And if the methodology in question
is one that purports to apply to the interpretation of the entire
Constitution, then it may be that what makes one case like
another for purposes of that methodology is that its resolution
turns on the interpretation of the Constitution. Let us return to
Heller and consider the application of an originalist analysis.
For substantive purposes, Heller is a Second Amendment case,
and its holding would not likely have a broad impact beyond
that context. Originalism, however, is not merely a Second
Amendment theory, but rather a theory that applies to the
whole Constitution. Under the most natural conceptions of
originalism, the fact that would trigger an originalist analysis
is that a case concerns the application of the Constitution.169
For purposes of assessing whether a subsequent case was “like”
169 Randy Kozel has recently illustrated this dynamic in his examination of the
interrelationship between the application of precedent and interpretive theory. He
demonstrates “that whatever one’s interpretive theory of choice, it will be inextricably
linked to the proper treatment of constitutional precedents and questions of stare decisis.”
Randy J. Kozel, Settled Versus Right: Constitutional Method and the Path of Precedent,
91 TEX. L. REV. 1843, 1864 (2013). In other words, one’s conclusions about whether a prior
case is one that should be given precedential effect will depend, in part, on one’s
interpretive theory. His analysis is focused on precedential weight, in the sense that
methodology influences whether a past case was wrongly decided and if so whether it is
intolerably wrong. A strict originalist, for example, will accept no past case that is
contrary to a proper originalist understanding, while a living constitutionalist will be
more tolerant of error. Although weight is the focus, there are aspects of scope present
here as well. Moreover, he recognizes the point I assert above, namely that the analysis
necessarily generalizes across the entire Constitution (although the specific mix of the
living constitutionalist’s analysis will vary from one context to another). Id. at 1869.
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the first one, then, the relevant question would simply be
whether it, too, concerned the application of the Constitution.
This aspect of the “likeness” assessment has at least two
significant implications. First, it suggests that methodological
stare decisis could not be contained.170 That is, its application
would tend immediately to require the extension of the same
methodology to all corners of the Constitution.171 To be sure,
that would not be problematic in the eyes of everyone. For a
strict originalist, who views substantive stare decisis as
unpalatable because it condones the maintenance of doctrine
inconsistent with original understanding, this is precisely how
the world should work. But there are very few strict
originalists. And many Justices (or commentators, or citizens)
who are willing to go along with an originalist analysis of the
Second Amendment will not be willing to thereby commit to
originalist analysis across the Constitution.172 One response to
this observation is to suggest that a theory need not apply
across the entire Constitution. Perhaps there could be one
approach for the rights-related provisions and another for the
structural provisions. We might imagine slicing things up even
more finely than that. This might reduce, but it would not
eliminate, the effect. The risk of spillover would remain within
whatever domains we arrive at. What is more, settlement on the
appropriate set of methodological subareas would itself require
resort to some broader theory of the Constitution, which would
of course have to be applied across the Constitution in order to
support the coherence of the resulting distinctions and thereby
return us to our starting place.
The second implication is that we might not be
comfortable with the narrow, rigid conception of likeness that
would result from using methodology as our measuring stick.
Consider again the example of originalism. The Framers
viewed the world very differently than we do, and consistent
application of their understanding would result in classes of
cases in which their assessment of likeness would control even
though it is radically different from our own. The Framers
were, for example, much more inclined toward the differential
treatment of men and women. To them, cases involving males
170 See GERHARDT, supra note 5, at 48-49.
171 Not all theories, of course, claim to have application to the entire Constitution,
and one can certainly imagine a principled line calling for the application of different
methodologies to, say, the “rights” provisions of the Constitution versus the “powers”
provisions. There would nonetheless remain a substantial risk that giving precedential
effect to methodological choices would impose a too-rigid measure of likeness.
172 See Scalia, supra note 89, at 861 (noting that originalism, “[i]n its
undiluted form, at least, . . . is medicine that seems too strong to swallow”).
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and females would not be “like” cases in the way that they
would be for us. The generalized application of a single
methodology, then, would enable a single metric for assessing
likeness—whatever it is that triggers application of the
methodology—to swamp all the other facts and circumstances
of the case, even though as a society we might be inclined to
regard some of these latter factors as more significant to the
determination of likeness. In broad form the argument I have
just outlined tracks one of the more powerful critiques of
originalism, with the analysis simply generalized to other
methodologies. Any form of originalist analysis with bite, it
seems, would generate unpalatable results when viewed from a
contemporary perspective. There are too many established
nonoriginalist doctrines and practices for it to be otherwise. It
is this reality that leads Justice Scalia to acknowledge that he
is a “faint-hearted” originalist.173 It is a reality that afflicts
every theory of interpretation.
It is also worth revisiting the non-binary nature of stare
decisis as doctrine. It creates a presumption—not a
requirement—that courts will adhere to past cases. Especially in
the context of constitutional law,174 the very nature of the doctrine
contemplates overruling and change. This is manageable when
tied to substance. When precedent is applied within a substantive
domain its binding effects are limited, as are the consequences of
its overruling. This is because the categories of assimilation
that come into play with the application of stare decisis to
substantive law have natural limits. A Fourth Amendment
case, for example, will almost certainly not cast its precedential
shadow over any other portions of the Constitution, and its
scope is likely to be limited to some specific subset of cases,
such as those involving a particular context or type of search.
The effects of its overruling would likewise be contained.
When the categories of assimilation are as broad as they
almost invariably are in the case of methodology, however, the
dynamic changes. Because of the wide range of application, one
possibility is that we would end up in a position in which stare
decisis necessarily operated as a binary doctrine, given the
large costs that would be associated with any reversal.175
Another is that we would experience wild shifts across
constitutional law as shifting majorities of the Court decided to
173 Id. at 864.
174 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
175 As noted above, this seems to be an implication of methodological stare decisis
as applied to statutory interpretation. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
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change methodological course. In both scenarios, of course,
there would be sweeping substantive effect, as methodological
change would generate different substantive rules. The most
likely effect would be that methodological stare decisis would
simply be unsustainable; the Court would be unlikely to find
all the substantive conclusions generated by a particular
methodology palatable. It would feel compelled to depart from
the application of any methodology in at least some cases, and
the question would become whether it would do so openly—
thus forsaking methodological stare decisis—or do so covertly,
in which case there would be a great(er) gulf between what the
courts are actually doing and how they depict what they are
doing. Alternatively, the settled methodologies would be so
malleable as to provide no real constraint, allowing shifting
majorities to reach results that would seem inconsistent under
a more rigid methodology without providing the relative
transparency that contemporary pluralism provides.
Let us return to the example of originalism, and assume
it has been given precedential effect as the proper interpretive
methodology. There are situations in which it is understood
that a strict application of originalism would lead to an
unpalatable result, such as with respect to the constitutionality
of paper money.176 Were the Court faced with a challenge under
the Legal Tender Clause, it would have to choose between a
“correct” but incredibly disruptive result (a declaration that
paper money is unconstitutional) or a departure from the
established methodology. A methodological departure could
itself have disruptive effects because, however justified, it
would call into question the general applicability of the
preferred methodology. If the Court allowed itself to depart
from originalism because of the costs associated with its
application in one type of situation, then, at a minimum, it
would raise the possibility that there are other situations
where a similarly justified departure would be warranted as
well.177 However broad the exception, its existence would
176
A Supreme Court that held that paper money and Social Security were
unconstitutional, that Brown v. Board of Education was wrongly decided, or
that states need not adhere to one-person, one-vote principles would be
rightly denounced by the public as committing grave constitutional errors—
even if the Court could demonstrate compellingly that its rulings reflected
the original understanding in every case.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the Lens of Hartian
Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1107, 1141-42 (2008).
177 Monaghan, supra note 37, at 723-24, 772.
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undercut the benefits of a regime of methodological stare
decisis, which depends to a great degree on the uniformity of
the preferred methodology’s application. Of course, it might be
possible to implement some sort of carve out for already-
decided cases that reach a result inconsistent with the
preferred methodology. But that would be to commit the same
sin that originalists who accept non-originalist precedents
commit, and it would be to sanction an essentially pragmatist
methodology (that of stare decisis) over the preferred
originalist approach.
This decay in the universality of methodological stare
decisis would undercut the other benefits associated with stare
decisis. Predictability would suffer because it would be difficult
to anticipate precisely when application of the preferred
methodology would generate a result that was sufficiently
unpalatable as to be overridden. At the same time, decisional
cost savings would decrease as it became necessary to assess
whether each case presented a suitable candidate for
departure. These are, to be sure, comparative points, and one
could credibly contend that even a watered-down version of
methodological stare decisis would be preferable to the
methodological free-for-all that characterizes the Court’s
present practices.
In the end, any effort to impose methodological stare
decisis seems likely, at most to settle into a weak hierarchy of
methodological preferences rather than the sort of rigid
obligation that the logic of methodological stare decisis would
entail. The Justices surely recognize the concern Justice
O’Connor voiced in Michael H.,178 namely that commitment to a
single mode of analysis might prove too constricting in future
cases both anticipated and unanticipated. We will return to the
matter in Part III.
2. Stare Decisis and Decision Rules
When we shift our gaze from operative propositions to
decision rules, the analysis changes considerably. As we have
just seen, there are two difficulties that preclude the easy
application of stare decisis to interpretive methodology as
applied to operative propositions. The first is mechanical, in
that resort to methodology as the metric for assessing like
treatment leads to consideration of “likeness” in terms of
amenability to methodology, which means using a very broad
178 See supra note 4.
48 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:1
category of assimilation. As a result, it would almost certainly
require application of the same methodology across wide
swaths of the Constitution and indeed probably to the entire
document. This would, in turn, overwhelm the more specific,
situational features of cases that we would be likely to regard
as more germane to determining which are alike. The second is
more theoretical and stems from the recognition that the use of
stare decisis and other methodologies arises out of the same
base of social consensus. As such, it is consensus rather than
stare decisis that must provide the ultimate basis for
methodological uniformity.179
Decision rules, in contrast, do not present the same
difficulties. The mechanical problem of indefinite scope falls
away because decision rules come with built-in limits, for the
simple reason that they are tied to specific operative
propositions. Methodological stare decisis at this level, then,
incorporates the same built-in scope restrictions as apply to
substantive stare decisis. The Court can accordingly adopt and
bind itself to a methodology for implementing an operative
proposition180 without fear that it will bind itself in some
unanticipated way in some distant corner of the Constitution.
Consider, for example, the Court’s recent line of cases
formulating and refining a framework for the treatment of
hearsay evidence under the Confrontation Clause. In Crawford
v. Washington,181 the Court, via a deeply originalist analysis,
held that the clause applies only to “testimonial hearsay.”182
Subsequent cases183 have refined the tests by which the
179 This is not to suggest that such consensus cannot manifest itself through
the use of stare decisis or something that looks like stare decisis, but rather that for
that to happen the consensus that shapes our broader choice of methodological tools
would have to evolve so as to give stare decisis that sort of power. Even then, stare
decisis would be acting as something of a pass-through doctrine, and would serve more
as evidence of an emerging consensus about a given methodology than it would as a
reason for privileging that methodology.
180 This process raises another possible context for the implementation of
methodological stare decisis, namely the methodology by which the Court formulates
decisions rules in service of operative propositions. The factors that presently go into
that formulation are, as Berman describes, fairly ad hoc, turning on an assessment of,
among other things, the values served by the operative proposition being implemented
and a sense of the institutional capacities of courts and other actors to get to the
bottom of whether the operative proposition is being satisfied in any given case. See
supra note 161 and accompanying text. Given the wide range of values served by
operative propositions, it would seem most appropriate to treat the process of
formulating decision rules as on par with that of determining the scope of the operative
propositions themselves.
181 See supra note 3, at 138-41.
182 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
183 See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009); Giles v.
California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). For a more
complete discussion, see Oldfather, supra note 3.
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testimonial nature of statements is to be assessed. Because they
are tied to a specific context, those cases do not naturally apply
more broadly. Put differently, the categories of assimilation are
tied to the substantive reach of the Confrontation Clause, and
this is because the cases’ methodological commitments are tied
to an understanding of an operative proposition that applies
only in certain contexts.
To generalize, the connection between the applicability
of decision rules and operative propositions means that the
relevant categories of assimilation will be tied more closely to
the factual aspects of situations that would normally be taken
into account in considering whether two cases are equivalent.
Thus a decision rule implementing the Fourth Amendment will
be based on the sorts of factors that come into play in the
typical case implementing the Fourth Amendment, and a court
need not worry that it will be applied to the First Amendment
or Article III or any provision beyond the Fourth Amendment
(and perhaps even some subset of situations to which the
Fourth Amendment applies). Because the applicability of a
decision rule will be limited in this way, the consequences of
overturning a decision rule will likewise be contained. Stare
decisis, as doctrine, can apply in this context, and do so in its
typical, scalar way.
In similar fashion, the other justifications for precedent
fit more comfortably with its application to decision rules, due
largely to the different nature and narrower scope of the
categories of assimilation. Predictability becomes much more
easy to achieve when a methodology applies within a defined
scope because it is easier to anticipate the various scenarios
that might arise under that scope and how the methodology
might apply, which in turn contributes to stability. Decisional
efficiency is likewise enhanced as the methodological
framework becomes familiar.
The theoretical disconnect disappears as well. Because a
decision rule exists only in service of an operative proposition,
consensus is built in. So long as the Court continues to adhere
to a given understanding of an operative proposition, that
understanding serves to fix the Justices’ concept of what a
decision rule in that context should be designed to do. Because,
for example, the Court has maintained rough consistency in its
conception of the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, it
has maintained fidelity to tiered scrutiny as an appropriate
tool for implementing that meaning. A change in the Court’s
conception of the operative proposition would destroy that
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consensus, but a new formulation would provide a relatively
fixed starting point from which to establish another.
III. THREE EXPLANATIONS FORMETHODOLOGICAL
PLURALISM
We live in a world in which constitutional interpretation
is characterized by methodological pluralism. Sometimes the
Court’s opinions embrace an originalist analysis and sometimes
they do not. When they do, the embrace is often partial and
accompanied by other modes of analysis. What is more, later
cases demonstrate no great concern for the methodology of
their predecessors.184 Yet, as we have seen, it is a pluralism
that is bounded by areas of consensus, both in terms of
methods that are consistently followed as well as those are
universally regarded as inappropriate. Given the existence of
some methodological uniformity within the realm of
constitutional law, the persistence of pluralism presents a
puzzle. If we can adhere to consistent methodologies in some
aspects of constitutional interpretation, why not do so across the
board? Stare decisis seems at first blush to present a promising
mechanism for remedying this inconsistency, but as we have
seen it can operate effectively only at the narrow level of
decision rules. Methodological disputes relating to the meaning
of operative propositions, in contrast, can ultimately be resolved
only by reference to social consensus, which in the constitutional
context is linked to the acceptance or acquiescence that
legitimates the entire constitutional regime.
This Part broadens the focus to consider other categories
of explanations for the pluralist world of constitutional
interpretation that we live in. The goal is not so much to argue
that any one of these explanations is correct, because there is
likely something to each of them. The first is that
methodological pluralism is normatively desirable, and the
functioning of constitutional law is a recognition of that
desirability. As we will see, although there are compelling
arguments in favor of a pluralistic approach, there is little
reason to believe that the participants in the system of
constitutional law-making regard themselves as engaged in an
intentionally pluralistic effort. The second explanation is that
there is a lack of consensus on the methodologies of
determining constitutional meaning, coupled with the absence
of any mechanism by which any single methodology could
184 See supra notes 1-8, 20-24 and accompanying text.
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attain a privileged position over the others. Stare decisis, or
some similar rule-consequentialist argument for the
establishment of a single methodology, is the most obvious
candidate, but does not work for the reasons we have seen.
Pluralism, on this account, is simply a default. Finally, it may
be that methodological consensus is unattainable for reasons
that are external to the processes of adjudication. It might be
that any methodology worthy of the title would be too
determinate, and would thereby, if consistently adhered to,
commit the Court to results that it could not afford to reach. The
Court has limited institutional capital, and in situations where
adherence to the preferred methodology would lead to a result
that the other branches would ignore, it would be faced with a
choice among openly departing from the preferred methodology,
covertly departing from the preferred methodology, or reaching
the politically unpalatable result. We will consider these
possibilities in turn.
A. The Prescriptive Case for Pluralism
Because constitutional interpretation in practice is so
clearly pluralistic in nature, it is natural to want to conclude
that pluralism is normatively desirable. There are multiple
versions of the case for pluralism. Among the grounds on which
the Justices might affirmatively choose to engage in pluralistic
interpretation are: (i) that pluralism is the interpretive
approach that is best able to ascertain and give effect to the
meaning of the Constitution; (ii) that there is no such thing as
a fixed, ascertainable meaning of the Constitution, but that
pluralism best gives effect to a core principle underlying the
Constitution; (iii) that there is neither a fixed meaning nor a
single underlying principle, but that pluralism best facilitates
the achievement of other ends served by the Constitution; and
(iv) that pluralism is desirable for reasons that have less to do
with making sense of the Constitution as a document or set of
ideas and more to do with pluralistic interpretation as social
good in its own right. These justifications overlap with one
another, of course, as well as with many of the ideas explored
in the next subsection. We will consider them in turn.
One version of the argument that pluralism is the approach
best able to give meaning to the Constitution rests on an
understanding that the Constitution has a meaning that is more or
less fixed. This could be so because the document itself has a fixed
meaning (whether in the sense that there is a meaning that is fixed
in the words of the document or in the sense that we can posit the
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existence of a meaning of an evolving Constitution at any given
moment) or because there is some determinate core to the practice
of interpreting the Constitution. In either case, the argument is
that pluralism provides the best route to ascertaining and applying
this fixed meaning. This might, for example, be based on a
conclusion about the Constitution’s nature as a document that
seeks to achieve a variety of ends through clauses that differ in
their functions and specificity.185 On that view, it might make sense
to vary interpretive approach depending on whether the clause in
question is a source of or limitation on governmental power,
phrased in broad or narrow language, a term of art or not, and so
on, as well as based on features of the factual setting in which it is
being applied. Relatedly, it might be that the various rules,
principles, and norms embodied in the Constitution are too
nuanced to be captured in a tidy methodological approach.186 Under
either variation there is a discoverable meaning, but ex ante
identification of the proper modes of uncovering that meaning is
impossible either because the process is too context-specific or
because the process is too nuanced to be reduced to words.187 It may
be, in other words, that language is too blunt an instrument to
capture the ideas that drive methodological selection, and that any
attempt to articulate an interpretive principle or approach to
185 See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 2, at 1756 (“The Constitution is a complex
document consisting of many clauses, each of varying degrees of generality and
ambiguity. Just as we have a variety of rules of grammar, using a variety of principles
or interpretive methods seems appropriate when interpreting a complex document such
as the Constitution.”).
186 For example, one might describe
constitutional interpretation [as] a ‘practice’ in the sense in which
philosophers use that term: it is a complex form of socially established
activity that is both made possible and given structure by implicit rules,
norms, standards, and conventions—terms that, for the most part, I use
interchangeably. The rule structure need not be articulable by everyone who
participates in the practice, any more than someone must be able to state the
rules of grammar in order to speak proper English. But without some
structure of rules—capable of defining, for example, what counts as a
constitutional argument at all—constitutional interpretation would not be a
practice but a cacophony of confusion. In other words, the existence of at least
some widely shared norms, establishing constitutional interpretation as a
practice, is a necessary condition of our ability even to understand each
other’s constitutional arguments as successfully as we do.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1232-33 (1987) (internal citations omitted).
Proponents of what Fallon calls “open-system theories . . . maintain that the reasons
for pronouncing an approach correct or incorrect form patterns so complex as to defy
rule-like statements of the circumstances in which arguments of any particular kind
ought to dominate the result.” Id. at 1224.
187 See Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial
Function, 96 GEO. L.J. 1283, 1305-17 (2008).
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selecting from among interpretive principles would inevitably miss
the mark and lead the Court astray.188
A second, related argument is based on a denial of the
existence of such a fixed meaning. On this view, the inability to
fully specify the norms governing the interpretive process also
counsels in favor of methodological pluralism. Accordingly,
settlement on a single interpretive approach would not only be
unattainable, but also undesirable. It is hardly surprising that
we might find ourselves unable to articulate all the features of
an approach designed to hit a target that moves based on a
large and complex array of social factors. For, as we have seen,
if the meaning of the Constitution rests on extra-constitutional
grounds, then interpretive theories applied to the task of
extracting that meaning necessarily rest at least partially on
extra-constitutional grounds.
What is more, it seems likely that the competing ends of
constitutional interpretation and the various ways in which we
prioritize them cannot be reduced to or reconciled via the consistent
application of a single methodology. Our disagreements are broad
and deep, and extend so far as to include whether the enterprise
of judicial review is legitimate.189 Thus, it is not surprising that
we should find ourselves unable to reach any consensus as to the
proper way to go about judicial review. To be sure, there is
undoubtedly a practical consensus as to the legitimacy of judicial
review, in the sense that its very existence is not contested as a
matter of doctrine—though its reach is certainly contested via
debates over things like justiciability rules190 and the various
doctrinal fights concerning the extent to which the political
process ought to be regarded as the appropriate source of
constitutional discipline.191 But differing conceptions of the
188 As Richard Fallon puts it,
the Justices might believe that although they are bound by tacit norms of
constitutional adjudication, their tacit knowledge defies accurate expression
in propositional form. Specifically, the [J]ustice might believe that although
one or another constitutional theory comes closest to describing accurately
the normative constraints to which they are subject, none does so perfectly,
and that the tacit norms of constitutional adjudication thus actually
constrain them from adopting any theory that might diverge from those tacit
norms in possibly unforeseeable future cases.
Fallon, supra note 2, at 1013-14 .
189 BOBBITT, supra note 121, at 5.
190 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73
(2007) (critiquing the suggestion that justiciability rules provide a sensible set of
limitations on judicial power).
191 See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights: A
Defense of Judicial Review in a Federal System, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 89, 103-04 (2004)
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function(s) of judicial review will have implications for specific
interpretive tasks, and if one accepts the proposition that
judicial review serves more than one function, then one is also
likely to believe that different modes of interpretation are
appropriate in different sorts of cases.192 A perspective that is
fixated on the counter-majoritarian difficulty, and is
accordingly skeptical of judicial intervention, will find different
interpretive approaches congenial than will a perspective that
views courts as proper agents of change. In essence, the
suggestion is that there are simply too many different
mechanisms and ideas within the Constitution, and too many
perspectives brought to the Constitution by those interpreting
it, for any single meaning to exist or method to work.193
This suggests a third variety of normative argument in
favor of pluralism, which rests on the view that pluralism best
achieves some other goal that its proponent wishes to prioritize.
Thomas Merrill, for example, has advocated an approach to
judicial review that emphasizes judicial restraint, which he
defines in terms of an observer’s ability to predict the result in a
case based on what has come before.194 This approach is
methodologically agnostic in the sense that it “simply requires
that the judge adhere to whatever method produces the most
easily-predicted results.”195 Laurence Tribe hints at a different
(discussing the claim that the political process can be relied on to protect federalism
interests).
192 See BOBBITT, supra note 121, at 124 (“Because there are many facets to
any single constitutional problem and . . . many functions performed by a single
opinion, the jurist or commentator uses different approaches as a carpenter uses
different tools and often many tools in a single project.”).
193 Pragmatic theories of constitutional interpretation take a similar approach.
For example, Dan Farber and Suzanna Sherry ground their vision of judicial review in
both a rejection of the various “grand theories” that seek to bind judges to a single idea,
see generally DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY:
THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (2002), and a recognition
that judges operate under real though imperfect constraints that channel their
constitutional decisionmaking yet allow for the exercise of judgment and the application
of multiple methodologies, see generally DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY,
JUDGMENTCALLS: PRINCIPLE ANDPOLITICS INCONSTITUTIONALLAW (2009).
194
As I use the term, judicial restraint refers to a style of judging that produces the
fewest surprises. Restrained judges render decisions that conform to what an
experienced lawyer, familiar with the facts of the case and the relevant legal
authorities, would counsel a client would be the most likely outcome. A restrained
judge, in this sense, is not necessarily deferential to other political institutions.
Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis and the Promotion of Judicial Restraint,
22 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 274-75 (2005).
195 “In other words, the value to be maximized—judicial restraint in the sense
of a minimum of surprises—does not logically entail any particular judicial
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rationale. Having noted that constitutional argumentation
inevitably flows from premises “that no one can claim to have
‘discovered’ in a privileged place external to the disputants
themselves and insulated from who they are and what groups
they belong to,”196 Tribe observes that “in matters of power, the
end of doubt and distrust is the beginning of tyranny.”197
A final type of account is oriented less toward the
document and the ideas it embodies and more toward pluralism’s
value in facilitating collective buy-in to the enterprise of judicial
review and indeed to the American governmental system more
generally. The lack of any settled interpretive methodology allows
us to transcend our varied disagreements in the sense that each
of us can lay claim to the true meaning of the Constitution. This
means that determinations of constitutionality can be shallowly
reasoned and “incompletely theorized.”198 Because they can
resort to an array of different methodologies, the Justices are
able to justify the Court’s decisions in a way that can provide
multiple segments of society with what they regard as
satisfactory reasons. At the same time, dissenting Justices are
able to articulate an alternate path of reasoning that will
resonate with a different segment of the populace, who are
accordingly able to regard their perspectives as having been
aired and who have reason to hope their view will prevail in the
next case. The overall result is that the Court’s decisions are
acceptable on a scale that would be unattainable were the
Justices to attempt to reach agreement on a deeper justification.
There is a related sense in which pluralism might foster
constitutional legitimacy. Because acceptance provides a very
shallow source of constitutional legitimacy, it depends on
breadth of support.199 Our acceptance of the Constitution’s
legitimacy is not, for most of us, the product of any sort of
conscious choice to be bound, but rather comes about via
something that is better described as acquiescence.200 The
existence of differing methodological approaches, with their
methodology; the question of which methodology produces the most restraint is
contingent upon other features of the legal system.” Id. at 275.
196 LAURENCEH. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 5 (1985).
197 Id. at 7 (italics omitted).
198 See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 1733, 1735 (1995).
199 See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 26, at 1771-72 (contending that the
Constitution’s legitimacy is tied to its general acceptance, which is in turn tied to a
variety of interpretive approaches).
200 See Legitimacy, supra note 51, at 1827 (“There is too much controversy
among legal elites, and too little informed endorsement among the mass public, to
warrant strong claims of legal legitimacy (as opposed to weak or disputable ones) for
the interpretive methodologies that substantially define the judicial role.”).
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varying underlying conceptions of the functions of the
Constitution, enables this thin acceptance to continue by giving
most segments of the population at least an occasional victory
and thus vindication of its constitutional vision.201 It is easier
for the losing side in a case to accept defeat if it knows that it is
only the result, and not the premises underlying it, that are
established. This provides an incentive for the consistent
voicing of dissenting views, thereby keeping the dialogue alive.
This dynamic could explain both the lack of strong stare decisis
with respect to substantive holdings and the lack of any formal
requirement of methodological consistency.202
These arguments have considerable appeal. Perhaps
there is methodological consensus, but centered on pluralism
rather than any single approach. Nonetheless, while pluralism
undoubtedly characterizes the actual practice of constitutional
argumentation and decision making, there is little evidence to
suggest that any of the participants in the process regard
themselves as intentionally engaged in a pluralistic process.
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Michael H.203 nods in that
direction. And perhaps Chief Justice Roberts’s confirmation
hearing statements about not having “an overarching judicial
philosophy that I bring to every case”204 can be regarded as an
endorsement of pluralism.205 Indeed, perhaps those Justices
and judges who claim not to have a theory are really endorsing
pluralism, though there seems to be a difference between
simply not having a theory of judging and affirmatively
embracing a pluralistic approach.206 The consciously pluralistic
Justice may actively seek to consider an array of perspectives
201
If anything, the cacophony of American constitutional discourse over the last
two hundred years suggests that it is not constitutional rhetoric that unites us;
it is our collective, social ability to see ourselves and our views in the
Constitution when they are not there that unites us . . . . [M]ost views with any
significant political support in American society usually get reflected in the
constitutional opinions and rhetoric of at least one Supreme Court Justice.
Steven G. Calabresi, The Crisis in Constitutional Theory, 83 VA. L. REV. 247, 264 (1997).
202 See BOBBITT, supra note 121, at 187-89.
203 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
204 See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be
Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 159 (2005) (statement of CJ. John G. Roberts, Jr.), available at http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/GPO-CHRG-ROBERTS/pdf/GPO-CHRG-ROBERTS.pdf.
205 Cf. RUSH, Freewill, on PERMANENT WAVES (Mercury Records 1980) (“If you
choose not to decide, you still have made a choice.”).
206 But see Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1, 9 (1998) (observing that “while in one sense pragmatism is indeed a
theory, . . . in an equally valid and more illuminating sense it is an avowal of
skepticism about various kinds of theorizing”).
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in her decision making, for example, while the non-theorist will
perhaps be less systematic. But there is little else in the
Court’s opinions to support the proposition that the Justices
regard themselves as collectively committed to such a mission
and even if some of the Justices support pluralism the support
for it is quite obviously not unanimous. The descriptive reality
thus seems not to be explained by some effort—whether in the
sense that we can regard “the Court” as engaged in the effort or
merely some of the Justices on it—to achieve a prescriptive
ideal. The explanation must lie elsewhere.
B. Pluralism as Default
If it is not the case that the Justices are intentionally
embracing pluralism, but it is the case that pluralism is what
we see, perhaps the appropriate conclusion is that pluralism is
the default position. When the participants in the system
cannot agree on how to approach some of the interpretive
problems presented, pluralism will result so long as there are
zones of dissensus concerning constitutional interpretation.
Consider the hypothetical Court with which we opened, facing
a sequel to Heller.207 We could not expect it to adhere to Heller’s
methodology because we have reached no consensus on what
the Court should be doing, and what values the Justices should
privilege, in these interpretive contexts. Yet the questions
arise, and the courts must resolve them.
There are three components to the argument that this is
the correct account of the interpretive practice that we see. The
first is that there is no legal or extra-legal consensus that has
developed with respect to questions of interpretive
methodology. Whether it is a product of differing theories of
constitutional legitimacy, differing notions of the function of
judicial review or of the ends of government under the
Constitution, or simply different psychological orientations, our
constitutional discourse is cacophonous rather than choral.
Each justice, each constitutional theorist, and, one imagines,
each person to have given considerable thought to the matter,
has his or her own take on the appropriate approach to the
task. To take the easiest example, Justices Scalia and Thomas
are both understood to be originalists, but they are not the
same sort of originalists.208
207 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
208 They parted ways, for example, in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005); see
also Andrea Waters, Justice Antonin Scalia vs. Justice Clarence Thomas: The
58 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:1
This leads to the second component of the argument,
which returns us to the notion that the Court is a collection of
individuals rather than an institution with a collective will—a
“they” and not an “it.”209 Each Justice has a different view of
methodology, some of them fully developed and others less so,
some of them based on a single factor and some of them more
pluralistic. Each will find herself in the majority in some cases
and will render opinions that read as if her preferred method of
interpretation is established, accepted, and uncontroversial. She
will do so on the understanding that these methodological
pronouncements will not be regarded as binding, but perhaps
with the hope that they will be persuasive. Each opinion thus
serves as part of a largely uncoordinated effort to establish social
consensus as to the appropriateness of the premises underlying
the approach it adopts. Indeed, Justice Scalia has acknowledged
as much with respect to his dissenting opinions.210
The final component of this account is recognition that
there is no mechanism for forcing consensus. As we have seen,
stare decisis is incapable of overriding this lack of
methodological clarity. The decision to apply stare decisis is
itself a decision to employ a methodology. It is not a choice that
is inevitable, as demonstrated by civil-law systems, which do
not give precedential effect to judicial decisions. Instead, we
have chosen it on the common law’s understanding that doing
“law” entails the doctrine of precedent. That commitment is a
general one, and within it there exists disagreement over the
precise nature of what a commitment to precedent involves,
especially in terms of its scope.211 There is more general
“Originalist Bloc” Divided, (2012) (unpublished honors thesis, Berkeley Legal Studies),
available at http://legalstudies.berkeley.edu/files/2012/02/Andrea-Waters-Sp-11.pdf.
209 Vermeule, supra note 6, at 549.
210 Justice Scalia has expressly noted that he regards his dissents as engaged
in this sort of advocacy:
I’m advocating for the future. Who do you think I’m writing my dissents for? I’m
writing for the next generation and for law students. You know, read this and
see if you want to go down that road. We’d be better off on all sorts of issues—
on legislative history, on originalism. But I’m not going to persuade my
colleagues and I’m not going to persuade most of the federal bench. They’ve had
this so-called living Constitution stuff, you know, from the time they were in
law school. That’s not going to change. But maybe the next generation will see
the advantages of going back to the way we used to do things.
Dan Slater, Law Blog Chats With Scalia, Part II: ‘Master of the Dissent’, WALL ST. J.
LAW BLOG (May 30, 2008, 9:04 PM), blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/05/30/law-blog-chats-with-
scalia-part-ii-master-of-the-dissent/.
211 See supra note 42 and accompanying text. For a recent, sophisticated effort to
unpack the issues related to the scope of stare decisis in constitutional adjudication, see
generally Randy J. Kozel, The Scope of Precedent (Notre Dame Legal Studies Paper, No.
1443, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2312581 (click “Download This Paper”).
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agreement concerning its strength, especially as applied to
interpretation of the Constitution.212 It is understood to be a
methodology of flexible application that comes into play only in
the law’s transitional zones.213 It is, moreover, a process that in
its application is not independent of other methodologies, but is
instead deeply intertwined with them and grounded in the same
base of social consensus. A court’s conclusions about relevant
categories of assimilation will often, if not always, be based in or
at least influenced by its methodological assumptions. Facts that
are relevant to drawing connections between cases under one
methodology will be irrelevant under another.
This characterization is bolstered by the fact that the
nature of the Court’s case law is consistent with the suggestion
that what appears to be methodological stare decisis is simply the
emergence of consensus. Consensus is built-in when it comes to
decision-rule methodology.214 And insofar as the Court appears to
engage in consistent analysis with respect to determining
operative propositions, this consistency occurs not out of any
conscious decision to maintain fidelity with the approach of past
cases (or at least not primarily so) but rather out of the fact that a
succession of majorities have found a given method to be a
palatable approach. Over time, then, a given approach might
build up enough inertia or buy in (or become engrained in the
legal culture to such an extent) that it is no longer something to
be called into question. As efforts to persuade become successful,
“they” coalesce into “it.” In the meantime, however, the Justices
will continue to spar as they have.
C. Pluralism and External Constraints
A final category of explanation for methodological
pluralism arises out of the fact that the Court does not operate
in a vacuum. It has, as the saying goes, neither the power of the
sword or the purse, and consequently must resort only to the
power of its justifications to secure support for and compliance
with its rulings.215 Viewed from within the legal system, this
seems at first to present a strong argument for methodological
consistency. A court that can justify its decisions by referencing
212 See supra note 59.
213 See supra Part I.B.4.
214 See supra Part II.B.2.
215 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (James Madison); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s authority—possessed of neither the purse
nor the sword—ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction.”).
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its use of the methodology that it always uses is seemingly a
court that can invoke the rule of law rather than the rule of men.
Logical consistency, however, is not the same as political
palatability. The consistent application of any methodology that
is not completely manipulable and indeterminate would lead, at
least occasionally, to results that place the Court at odds with
those who must implement its decisions and with the public that
must accept them. The case of originalism and paper money
presents an easy example.216 It might be the case that if the
Court were to hold that paper money is unconstitutional the
result would be an amendment to the Constitution authorizing
paper money. Whether that were to result or not, it seems
likely that such a holding would generate considerable
backlash against the Court. Whether one accepts the version of
the story about President Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan, in
which the Court’s change in course was a result of the
associated political pressure, the underlying dynamic—one in
which the Court is aware of the fact that it risks being ignored
whenever its holdings stray too far from what is politically
palatable—is difficult to deny.217
On this account, methodological pluralism serves as
something like an institutional safety valve. The Court can
avoid having to follow the logic of a single approach to an
undesirable conclusion, and meanwhile preserves the ability to
offer a justification for its decision that draws from
methodologies that fall within the zone of appropriately legal
argumentation.
We can also consider the appointment process as part of
this dynamic. Whatever the significance of the “switch in time,”
much of the work of the New Deal Court was undertaken by
Justices appointed by President Roosevelt. The selection of those
Justices, as is largely true with Supreme Court appointments
more generally, depended to a great degree on their anticipated
approach to the job.218 This is not to suggest that the selection
216 See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
217 See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The
Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491, 544 n.246 (1997) (identifying situations in
which the Court appeared to check itself based on political realities); cf. Henry M. Hart,
Jr., The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 99 (1959) (noting that the
Court “does not in the end have the power either in theory or in practice to ram its own
personal preferences down other people’s throats”).
218 See, e.g., Robert S. Peck, New Supreme Court Justices and the “Freshman
Effect,” 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 149, 161-70 (2009); Lori A. Ringhand, In Defense of
Ideology: A Principled Approach to the Supreme Court Confirmation Process, 18 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 131, 160-61 (2009) (“[P]residents tend to get what they want on the
issues they care about, even if their nominees surprise them (or their reconfigured
political coalition) on other issues.”).
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process turns to a great deal on methodological commitments.
Indeed, one imagines that many prospective Justices would, like
Chief Justice Roberts, disclaim any such commitments. The
point is simply that the Court is not a closed system. Even if all
the Justices were to arrive at methodological consensus among
themselves, if that consensus were not shared by the legal
community more broadly, the appointment of new Justices to
the Court would upset whatever balance had been achieved.
CONCLUSION
As the proponents of statutory methodological stare
decisis have recognized, the case for the doctrine’s application
to constitutional interpretation seems plausible. Indeed, one
can credibly ask how we can claim to treat like cases alike
without committing ourselves to employing a consistent mode
of analysis. Why, then, do we not apply stare decisis to
interpretive methodology? Why would we not require, or at
least expect, a future Supreme Court that faces a Second
Amendment question and disagrees with District of Columbia
v. Heller to justify not only a departure from Heller’s
substantive holding but also its originalist mode of analysis?
At a narrow level, the answer is that stare decisis is, in
effect, too weak and ill-fitting a tool. Its force is scalar rather than
absolute, yet the logic of its application would entail a stare decisis
effect stretching across the entire Constitution, or at least large
swaths of it. Any attempt to use a case like Heller to bind
interpretive choices, then, would collapse under its own weight.
There is a theoretical disconnect as well, because resort to stare
decisis draws on a common well of legitimating social consensus
with other methodological choices. The privileging of any particular
methodology must accordingly be rooted in that consensus.
This connection to social consensus is also apparent in
those areas of constitutional adjudication where we do see
methodological consistency. Mostly this is within the narrow
realm of decision rules, like tiered scrutiny or Chevron, which
do not threaten to escape their substantive bounds, and which
are products of the provisional consensus generated by settled
operative propositions. Acceptance of a given understanding of
the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, for example,
generates a common understanding that tiered scrutiny is an
effective means to implement that meaning. But it is also
present at a broader level, as in our acceptance of the
appropriateness of appeals to past cases and the
inappropriateness of decisions based on coin flips or by resort
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simply to judges’ political preferences. In these latter situations
we share an understanding that proper judicial decision
making involves considering past cases but not deciding by coin
flip or based simply on politics. Stare decisis has a role to play
but it is as a handmaiden of transition, a device for providing
provisional stability and consistency as a broader consensus
forms or erodes. Stare decisis cannot, in other words, serve as an
external, doctrinal thumb on the scale that counsels in favor of
imposing and adhering to a specific methodological regime.
Consistency, stability, and the other features of stare decisis are
factors to be considered in the debate over methodology. They
are not independent, superior reasons for cutting off debate.
This does not settle the question of our lack of
methodological uniformity. It might be the answer, in the sense
that the pluralism that characterizes constitutional decision
making might simply be a default position, a necessary by-
product of a Supreme Court acting as a “they” until enough
consensus forms on a given proposition for the Court to act as
an “it.” Alternatively, perhaps we have reached consensus on
pluralism as our methodology. The unremarked-on way in
which the Justices bounce from one methodology to the next
may be a product of a collective understanding that this is how
we do it, that methodological clashes are important to ensure
that all perspectives are aired, a function that would be lost if
we adhered to a single approach. Finally, we must not forget
that the Court does not act in a vacuum, and that the Justices
must remain mindful of the limits of their authority.
Adherence to a single methodology might entice them to exceed
those limits, thereby creating the possibility of institutional
clashes in which the Court is ill-equipped to engage.
In the end, the answer to the question of whether the
Justices in our hypothetical sequel to Heller would feel
themselves bound by its methodology is easy. They will not.
Explaining why that is so, and whether it ought to be so, however,
is not easy at all. This Article has certainly not provided the last
word on these questions. If I have succeeded in my task, however,
I will have demonstrated why they are important and provided a
solid starting point for further conversation.
